Turmoil of Transition: The United States and Mexican Revolutionaries, 1910-1915 by McMillan, Douglas F.
THE TURMOIL OF TRANSITION: THE UNITED STATES AND 
MEXICAN REVOLUTIONARIES, 1910,z,1915 
By 
DOUGLAS F o McMILLAN 
Bachelor of Science 
Southwest Missouri State College 
Springfield, Missouri 
1962 
Submitted to the fa.oulty of the Graduate College of' 
the Oklahoma. State University 
in partial fulfillment of 'th.e requirements 
· for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
July, 1966 
THE 'IURMOIL OF TRANSITION: THE UNITED STATES AND 





So far from God; 
So near the United Stateso 
Mexican Proverb 
The problems inherent in all revolutions are broader and more com.. 
. ' 
plex when lifted from their purely domestic aspects am forced to the 
center of the international sceneo This was the rate of Mexico in the 
years 1910-19150 The constantly shifting storms of change that swept 
over the country were magnified and 11 at times, worsened by the fear of 
intervention and meddling by the United States. 
The purpose of this study is to present o~e small aspect of the 
larger problem involved in dealing with nations in .a state of revolutiono 
In any period of violent change there will be groups that branch off from 
the stream of consenl!lls and attempt to channel the movement toward their 
objectiveso When factions of this type first started arriving in the 
United States in 1910 11 they were ignored or unnoticed until their con= 
tinuing presence made necessary an official attitude in dealing with 
themo The necessity for a policy gave birth to the question8 what 
stand could be taken that would satisfy the Amerloa.n"'supported governc, 
ment in Mexico in 1910 and still keep alive the image ct the United 
States a.s a democracy created by revolution? President William Howaro 
Taft0 s response was to follow a line that was always called nsutrality11 
but that varied in applicationo The neutrality of 1910 had littJ.e. in 
common with neutrality in 19120 qhapter II describes the contortions of 
the President and the State Department in adapting to changing 
iii 
ciraumstances. 
The Wilsonian confrontation with the Mexican melee provides an ex-
eel.lent contrast to tha.t of President Taft. Under any interpretation of 
the word, W:>odrow va.:Lson was not content to remain neutral in dealing 
with ~e events in Mexico. He not only wanted the revolution to succeed 
in its objectives, bll.t also had rather firm ideas as to what these ob-
. 
jectives were. President Wilson's complete confidence in popularly 
elected democratic government to solve the Mexican problems colored all 
of his actions from 1912 to 1915. These actions do not appear to be the 
result of a well-thought-out policy but rather the results of a lack of 
any clear understanding of the forces at work in Mexico and the men who 
led them. The consequence of this lack of understanding was a never-
ending vacillation that caused confusion, doubt and animosity as the 
American President bounced back and forth f'rom faction to faction. The 
longest part of the thesis, Chapter III, deals with this search for the 
ideal with methods that were not. 
All comments to the contrary notwithstanding, it is a fact that any 
thesis is the result of the work of many people. 'Ibis study is no ex.-
caption. I wish to extend sincere thanks and appreciation to Mr. Da.ve 
Wirren who advised, criticized and listened; to Dr. Theodore L. Agnew 
for correcting the many lapses into incoherency; and to Mr. James M. 
Pbteet for many hours of typing and also for convincing me daily that 
theses can be completed. 
iv 
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CHAPI'ER I 
11 POOR MEXIC0 ••• 11 
THE REVOLUTIONARY YFARS, 1910-1920 
Mexico entered the twentieth century with all the tra.ppings and gilt 
of a relatively prosperous and rapidly expanding industrial nation. Law 
and order seemed secure where before it had not been safe to travel in 
the backlands.l Railroads were starting to unite the country, and that 
requisite of modernity -- electricity -- was becoming more and more evi-
dent. The capital city could boast street lights that shone down on well 
paved, clean streets. 2 Visitors who arrived in Mexico City to celebrate 
the centennial of Mexican independence in 1910 noted these adornments and 
I 
praised Porfirio Diaz as one who had ruled long and well. Had these 
visitors scratched the surface, they would have found the affluence to be 
more apparent than real; already its supports were swaying with the 
precursory winds of revolution.3 
I 
Porfirio Diaz ruled Mexico with the rationale that all governmental 
actions were instituted for the good of the people, if not by them. In 
lFrank Brandenburg,~ Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 196~, P• 37. 
2 I , ( Jose Godoy, Porfirio Diaz: President of Mexico New York; G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1910), P• 75-;-
3Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 208 and Charles C. Cumberland, "Pre-
cursors of the Mexican .Revolution of 1910," Hispanic American Historical 
Review, XXII (May, 1942), 344-345. 
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actuality, the main beneficiary of his policies was the "Quadrumvirate" 
that controlled the economic, social, and religious life of the country. 4 
This group, composed of military, church, hacendados and foreign inves-
1 
tors, was not the innovation or Diaz. They had existed long before he 
came to power, and it fell to him to control and harness them if he ex-
pected a reign or any length. His more than thirty years of power ef-
fectively demonstrated his ability along these Unes. 
To the man in charge of largesse, it was comparatively easy to con-
trol these four factors. The army was expected to do littJ.e more than 
conduct an occasional sortie into the streets or countryside to smash 
small-scale uprisings. It was to be neither professional or powerful 
characteristics which could be dangerous if united with self-respect. 
Those who commanded were pacified and corrupted with gambling concessions 
and legal licenses to operate houses of prostitution.5 To control latent 
and less obvious unrest was the responsibility of the church.6 Through 
fear and superstitution, the illiterate Mexican peasant was coerced into 
an acceptance or the status quo that made a clear and definite deline-
ation between church and state impossible.? The omnipresent hacendado 
continued the time-worn tradition of his class by trying to satisy an 
insatiable appetite for land and more land. This greed was partially 
4Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Forge Village, Mass.: 
Atheneum, 1963), PP• 51-55. -
5Ernest Gruening, Mexico !!!!! ~ Heritage (New York: Century Co. , 
1928), PP• 301-302. 
6Ibid., P• 211. 
?Ibid., PP• 254-255 and Mo!ses Gonzil.ez Navarro, El Porririato: ~ 
Vida Social, Vol. IV of Historia li>derna de ~xico, ed:-Daniel Cos!o 
'ii:ii'regas (6 vols.; Mexico Citys F.ditoria ii;'rmes, 1955-1963), p. 4??. 
3 
placated by a Porfirian land reform law that provided for the sale of un,. 
cultivated plots of not more than 2,500 hectares. The interpretation of 
this measure resulted in purchases by single individuals that far ex-
ceeded the stated maximu.m. 8 The newest member of the "Quadrumvirate," 
the foreign investor, poured money into Mexico with reckless abandon, 
knowing that his demands would be met before those of the native capital·· 
ists. '!his group of exploiters was led by businessmen of the United 
States who controlled more than $2,000,000,000 of the economy and could 
count more than 290 companies at work on various projeots.9 
'Ihe system was smooth and profitable to those who participated, but 
had li tUe to recommend it to the more than two-thirds of the people who 
were non-participants. The agricru.ltural and industrial workers not only 
failed to progress, rut saw their purchasing power diminish during the 
Porfiriato.10 'Ihose who could buy had money in sufficient quantity to 
take a lackadaisical attitude toward the rising prices. 'Ihe remainder 
found that the cost of living made survival hard and comfort impossible. 
'!his had been the fate of the lower classes in Mexico for years, and 
they had suffered in silence. Now it was more obvious than before as 
the peasant and the rich man stared at each other across a chasm un-
bridged by a strong, growing middle class.11 Discontent was slight but 
8.Although it was not necessarily commonplace, there were purchases 
under this land law that reached outrageously high figures. three indi-
viduals alone bought land amounting to more than 8,000,000 hectares. See 
Navarro, !b, Porfiriato: .!!9!. Social, IV, pp. 188, 216. 
9Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (2 vols. 
Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books,1%°4J,I~ and J. Fred Rippy, The 
United States and Mexico (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), P• 31?. 
10 
Gruening, Mexico .!!19. Heritage, p. 136. 
11Ibid., PP• 64-65. 
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always present, and a sign of weakness on the part of the system could 
precipitate open and active r ebelli on. 
The awaited sign appeared in 1908 when, for reasons still not thor-
l 
oughly understood, Porfirio Diaz granted an interview to an American 
journalist named James Creelman. In this interview the old ruler stated 
that the present term would be his last and urged candidates to start 
preparing for the upcoming elections. Criticism of the Porfirian regime 
burst forth from all sides as both Porfiristas and reformers made ready 
for the election of 1910. n!az, more than a littJ..e shocked by the ran-
cor or these attacks, suppressed many or the groups. However, he did al-
low the Anti-Re-Electionists, a faction or young middle class Mexicans 
who had gained popular support, to continue their campaign although ar-
resting its leaders, including Francisco Madero. The results or the 
election were as expected. n!az was returned to office, and the system 
again cracked into action.12 
The fraudulent aspects of the election of 1910, following the Creel-
man statement, provided the spark that ignited the revolution. The 
Anti-Re-El.ectionist party had aroused popular sympathy, and the people 
resented the arrest of its leaders. When Francisco Madero fled the coun-
try after being released from prison, a murmur of approval swept the 
/ 
nation; when he issued his Pl.an of San lnis Potosi from San Antonio on 
October 5, 1910, the murmur changed to action, and people of like senti-
ments rallied to his cause. The first step of the Mexican revolution was 
under way. 
/ 
The San Inis Potosi plan proclaimed November 20, 1911, as the 
12 
Cline, United States !!!a. Mexico, pp. 120-121. 
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starting date or the Revolution.13 Within seven months, on May 25, 1911~ 
the old dictator or Mexico resigned. In the period between these two 
dates little or particular significance occurred. There were few battles 
or any size, with casualties to both sides being minimal. The only real 
I success of the revolutionaries was the capture or Ciudad Juarez, which 
provided a bargaining position and which signalled the resignation or 
D!az.14 The numbers or men involved were small in comparison with the 
total population or Mexico. Maderistas never totalled more than 20,000 
men, composed or small groups operating in various parts or the country. 
Fina.noes were meager, and the entire action consumed no more than 
$1 15 ,500,000. 
The question remains: all this being true, how could such a revo-
lution succeed and succeed with so little difficulty? Several responses 
can be ma.de. Porfirio Iiaz and his top subordinates were old, and their 
reaction to the danger was not as quick nor as forceful. as it once might 
have been. The average age of the cabinet was well over seventy, while 
that or the state governors was only slightly less.16 They had been en-
trenched in power for so long, and with only slight resistance, that a 
13The plan in its ,ntirety may be found in Rafael Martinez, Carlos 
M. Samper and Oral. J~se P. Lomelin, 1!_ Revoluci&'n ~~Hombres (Mexico 
City: Talleres Tipograficos de "El Tiempo", 1912), pp. iii-vii. 
14charles C. Cumberland, "Mexican Revolutionary Movements From 
Texas, 1906-1912," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, L (January, 1949), 
315. . . 
15ci1ne, United States !DE. Mexico, p. 121 and Gruening, Mexico !.!:2, 
Heritage, P• 94. 
16The cabinet or ofaz was composed of the Secretaries or War and 
Justice, who were over eighty years of age; heads or the Departments or 
Communication, Interior and Public Works, seventy; and the remaining mem-
bers, over sixty. The Porfirian governors were also old--two were past 
eighty, six over seventy and seventeen over sixty. See Frank Tannenbaum, 
Mexico: ,h Struggle !2!:, Peace !m! Bread ( New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1950), PP• 49-50. 
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caref'ully defined plan of controlling large scale insurrection was not 
present. The only resource that could have been used effectively was the 
I 
army, and here the Diaz system had succeeded too well in its objectives. 
The generals had so padded the muster rolls that the army consisted of 
mu.ch paper but not many meno These same generals looked on the revolu-
tion as little more than a lark that presented increased opportunity for 
graft in supply contracts.17 The answer, then, is probably found in a 
combination of old age with its debilitating effects plus a degenerative 
corruption that made resistance dif'f'icult and ineffectual. 
When the Porfiriato collapsed, the people of Mexico City awaited 
the arrival of the "Apostle" of the new. Mexico. The announcement that he 
would enter the capital city on June?, 1911, brought out jubilant crowds 
anxious for a glimpse of the future president.18 The man they came to 
see was a short, dark, rather unimpressive individual.19 Francisco Madero 
was the well-educated son of a wealthy hacendado. He had rapidly ac-
cumulated a forblne of his own and then, being a strange mixture of realc, 
1st and dreamer, liberal and conservative, had turned against the people 
of his class. In political philosophy he was a nineteenth century liber= 
al who had supreme faith and confidence in the ameliorative effects of 
universal suffrage and education. 20 Nothing more was needed to correct 
t he existing evils of &xi.can society and, if the people wanted more, 
17Gruening, Mexico !!12. Heritage, Po 302. 
l8stan1ey R. Ross, Francisco l• Madero: Apostle g!_ Mexican Democracy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 1750 
19F.dith O'Shaughnessy, Diplomatic Days (New York: Harper and Broth-
ers, 1917), p. 74. 
20Ross, Madero, pp. 51-60 and Robert E. Quirk,~ Mexican Revolu-
tion, 1914-12!2.: The Convention of Aguascalientes (moomington, Indiana: 
Ina!'ana University?ress, 1960),po Jo 
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voting and knowledge would give it to themo 
While Madero believed the revolution was political, there was less 
agreement among the oth,ers involved.21 The peasants, led by men like 
Emiliano Zapata in the south, believed it to be economically based on the 
need for land distribu~on.22 Those who demanded social reform, such as 
Pascual Orozco in the north, were positive the revolution would bring 
some manner of social equalityo23 The young man on the rise assumed that 
with the collapse of the old order, he would have a chance to climb to a 
higher position economically and socially. The members of the "Quadrum-
virate" feared all change and felt that reaction was the only course open 
to them. All of these groups pulled and pushed the new president until, 
in hopeless bafflement, he could only wait for the passion to pass and 
give the people time to get accustomed to the idea that if they did not 
have land or food, they did have democracy. 
By itself political philosophy is a poor substitute for reform; thus, 
as Madero waited, pondered, and planned, the revolution began to disinte-
grate. Pascual Orozco revolted in the north but was smashed by a member 
of the old military clique, 24 Victoriano Huerta. Zapata rose i n the 
south, using guerrilla tactics which made his defeat impossible. Two 
~ 
Porfirian generals, Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz, revolted and, though 
captured and obviously guilty of treason, were spared by the President 
21John J. Johnson, "Mexico's Nationalist Revolution," The Caribbean; 
Mexico Today, ed. A. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville, Florida: University of 
Florida Press, 1964), p. 10. 
22Rosa E. King, Tempest Over Mexico:! Personal Chronicle (Boston: 
Litt.le, Brown and Co.,, 1935),~260. 
23Brandenburg, Modern Mexico9 p. 49. 
24 O'Shaughnessy, Diplomatic ll9.ys, p. 300. 
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and allowed to continue their treachery within prison wallso While all 
this was occurring other elements of the Porfirian regime, as well as 
some of the former revolutionaries, fomented discord from within. 25 
In February, 1913, the Madero regime had tottered as far as it could 
go. Early in that month the two generals who were under arrest for trea-
sonous activities escaped and attacked the National Palace. In this en-
/ 
gagement Bernardo Reyes was slain, wt Felix Diaz a.rd his followers took 
refuge in the arsenal within Mexico City.26 Madero needed someone to 
crush this insurrection, and once again turned to the man who had demon-
strated ability in defeating Orozco -- Victoriano :Efu.erta. This was his 
last, and greatest, mistakeo General :Efu.erta was disgruntled at earlier 
treatment by Madero, and his role in the next few days was a study in 
perfidy. Convenientl.y all military acumen deserted him, and the shells 
fired by those under his command fell everywhere but on the entrenched 
insurrectionists. As the casualties among the citizens of Mexico City 
rose, the opinion became stronger that this was a Ml-scale revolution 
ard that a Porfirian-like leader was neededo27 It was Huerta's plan to 
fill this need. 
The General was aided in his plans, either directly or irdirectly, 
by the machinations of the United States ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson. 
The Ambassador had long been an opponent of Madero and advocated a return 
25 Ross, Madero, ppo 218-219 and Gruening, Mexico~ Heritage, Po 
95. 
26American Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to Secretary of State Phi-
lander c. Knox, February 9, 1913, in United States Department of State, 
Papers · Relating j;£ ~ Foreign Relations ~ .!al2 United States, 12JJ. 
(vitshington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1920, ppa 699m?OO .. Here~ 
inafter cited as~, and the proper year. 
27Gruening, Mexico .!!E. Heritage, po 3050 
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to the old secure strong-rule systemo28 He was able to realize his wishes 
when, on February 18, he called Huerta and Felix n!az together for a meet -
ing in the .American embassy and effected an armistice and pact. In this 
agreement the government positions were divided among the followers of 
the two generals.29 Madero had not resigned, but all, including the Am-
bassador, acted as if the resignation was an accomplished fact.30 On the 
same day, Wilson was informed of Madero•s arrest by Huerta and requested 
that no harm come to him. Huerta agreed, and the United States repre-
sentative proclaimed his faith in the good intentions of the new regime. 31 
Four days later Madero and his Vice-President were slain on a dark street 
while being transferred to another prison. 
Death provided Madero what he had never been able to obtain in life$ 
Supporters flocked to the standard of the murdered leader, and his name 
became the cry of the next phase of revolutiono32 Reports of his death 
quickly spread through the countl:'y and were followed by firm resolve that 
the revolution could fight within itself, but that no interference would 
be brooked from outsiders. Since Huerta was the interloper, immediate 
steps were taken to proclaim his rule illegal, unconstitutional and un-
acceptable. The most significant of these early proclamations was made 
28The anti-Madero attitude of Ambassador Wllson can be found in most 
of the dispatches he wrote in this period. For representative examples, 
see his dispatches for February 20, August 22, and August 28, 1912, in 
.fE:fR, 1912, PP• 722-723, 826-827, and 828-832. 
29American Ambassador Wllson to Secretary of state Knox, February 
18 and 19, 1913, in f!!:m, J.2!1, pp. 720-724. 
30Ross, Madero, P• 310. 
31American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, February 
18, 1913, in .ffiEli, illJ., p. 720. 
32:arandenburg, Modern Mexico, p • .51. 
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by Venustiano Carram:a, Maderista governor of Coahuila. In mid ... Febru.a:ry 
of 1913, he issued a statement urging all states to ref'u.se recognition 
and co-operation to the usurper and to use extraordinary powers to re .. 
store constitutional governm.ent.33 This action initiated the so-called 
Constitutionalist movement, which in the :following months became an in-
creasing irritant to the new dictator. In its ranks were middle class 
patriots or some wealth 'Who were sickened by the slaying of the President 
and 'Who opposed Huerta morally and politically, ex-Maderistas who ned 
north to escape the wrath of the newly re-established old order, and 
small-time bandits who continued rapine and pillage under the guise of 
righteous indignation.34 The two Constitutionalists 'Who rose to promi .. 
nence under Carranza•s leadership were Alvaro Obregtn and Francisco Villa, 
better known by the sobriquet Pancho. The form.er was a sincere and in-
telligent Mexican patriot with obvious military ability-, and the latter 
was a crude and bruta1 leader who believed that all wars were won by ex.. 
pending men in break-neck and bloody charges. Both individuals operated 
under the supervision or Venustiano Carranza, the First Chief or the 
Constitutionalist movement. Meanwhile in the south, Emiliano Zapata 
transferred his wrath from the slain Madero to the new dictator and con ... 
tinued to ta.lee outright the land ~t no government would give himo 
Victoria.no Huerta did not lack adherents to his reactionary regimeo 
Those who had felt the loss of the Porfirian gifts had tu.med to him with 
the expectation of receiving the traditional rewards. The Catholic 
Church, in its traditional desire for order, suppoz-ted the new ruler with 
'.33Proclama.tion of the Independent Constitutionalists or the state of 
Coahuila, February 19, 1913, in PRFR, 1913, P• 721. 
'.34Gruening, Mexico .!m£ Heritage, PP• 310-312 and Tannenbaum, Peace 
!!'!! Bread, Po 58 • 
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unseemly haste and was only slightly in advance of the hacendadQs and 
foreign investors. It was an attempt to stop time and tum Mexico back 
into the channel of exploit~tion and economic medievalism that had been 
her lot before 1910.35 But now the people knew something they had not 
known before. Revolution was an easy thing. Had they not removed nfaz 
in only seven months, after he had had thirty years to entrench himself? 
'!he new n!az would be even easier to remove. The people were beginning 
to enjoy these revolutions, but the next few years would change that as 
succeeding revolutionary waves brought desolation and extremity to a land 
that eventually would grow sick of both. Many of these waves were cre-
ated by seemingly unconnected events in the United States.36 
In March, 1913, vk>odrow Wilson, a slight, mild-looking scholar, was 
inaugurated as President of the United States, and the confused and torn 
country to the south was confronted by still another force. The ex-
Princeton professor regarded Mexico as an overly aggressive student who 
needed to be taught the error of his way.37 It was not a matter of recog~ 
nizing the faction in power at the moment in Mexico. This would be 
nothing more than expediency, and vk>odrow Wilson was listening to a 
different drummer. The crux of the situation in his opinion was one of 
morality involving recognition to an individual who had risen to power 
over the bodies of popularly elected constitutional leaders.38 There was 
35F,dith O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife in Mexico (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1916), p. 31 and Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 52. 
36Tannenburg, Peace and Bread, p. 58 and H. H. :D.inn, The Crimson 
Jester: Zapata ,2!. Mexico (New Yorks National Travel Club, 1934), P• 168. 
37Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: vk>odrow Wilson and the Occu-
pation S!!, Veracruz (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 19b2J,We 
2-3· 
38The best statement of President Wilson's moral outJ..ook on the 
Mexican situation can be found in his Swarthmore College Address, Oct. 
12 
a right and wrong involved, if he could only determine what it was. To 
ascertain the right moral position, he compounded his errors by dis-
patching special envoys who quickly fell under the spell of one or an-
other of the various revolutionary leaders.39 As their reports returned 
to Washington, the President vacillated from intervention to non-
intervention, to open aid and finally to utter helplessness. The only 
unity in such a policy was the desire to isolate and depose Huerta, and 
even this incurred the displeasure of the Mexican people.40 It was not 
a standard text-book problem, and Wilson found a constant effective poli .. 
cy hard to determine and impossible to impose. 
As President Wilson's insistence on the removal of Huerta hardened 
through 1913 and 1914, the Constitutionalists continued ma.king some en-
croachments on federal-held territory, particularly in the north. The 
United States Navy, which had been rushed to Mexican coastal waters dur-
ing the last days of the Madero administration, remained in position de-
spite the strong protests of the Huerta government. 41 In April, 1914, 
25, 1913, and the Mobile Address, October 27, 1913. See Ra.y Stannard 
Baker, \obodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (8 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, 
Doran and Co., Inc., 19'z7=1939), III, pp. 56, 67. 
39Ibid., IV, p. 307. 
400• Shaughnessy, Diplomat• s ~, p. 66 and Manuel Calero, The ~~ 
m Policy .2! \obodrow Wilson ( New York: Smith and Thompson, 1914 J, p. 15 .. 
4lsecretary of State Knox to American Ambassador Wilson, February 
27, 1913; American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Wllliam J. 
Bryan, March 20, 1913; American Embassy to Mexican Office of Foreign Af-
fairs, March 22, 1913; American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State 
Bryan, March 27, 1913; American Ambassador Wilson to Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Francisco de la Barra, April 1, 1913; Minister of Foreign Affairfi 
Francisco de la Barra. to American Ambassador Wilson, April 5, 1913; 
Secretary of State Bryan to Ambassador Wilson, April 17, 1913; and Act i ng 
Secretary of State T. B. Moore to American Ambassador Wilson, May 7, 
1913, in l.B.f!, 1913, PP• 275, 781-782, 785-786, 783, 786-787, 791-792, 
793, 799. 
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the crisis that Wilson had considered inevitable occurred.42 A gasoline 
crew from the American flagship, the Dolphin, went ashore at Tampico, was 
seized by federal troops and then released with apologies. The expres-
sions or regret were not considered sufficient by the United States naval 
commander of the area, who demanded an immediate disavowal of the action 
and a salute to the American nag. 43 To do this -would have cost Huerta 
support from the anti-American faction of Mexico which, as always, was 
vocal and latent. In not meeting such demands, he could appear as the 
individual who stood alone against the Yankee imperialists. His de-
oision was clear, and the following days witnessed an exchange of pro-
posals and counter-proposals that would have been amusing if the result 
had not been so tragic. 
The humor of the spectacle of two modern nations haggling over who 
would salute whose nag first disappeared with the introduction of battle 
plans of the United States to take Tampico or, due to a dangerous sandbar 
outside the harbor, to shell the port.44 These plans were a1tered on 
April 20 when United states Consul William Canada at Veracruz reported 
the expected arrival of a German steamer, the Ypiranga, with a cargo of 
war supplies tor Huerta's forces. 45 The occupation of Veracruz would 
achieve both long-and short-range objectives. Huerta's forces would be 
immediately hampered by the loss of the needed supplies. More 
42Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, §910-1211 (Cha-
pel Hill: University of North Carolina""Press, 1944), p. 1 9. 
43Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo to General Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza, 
April 9, 1914, in .f.Rm, 1914, PP• 438-44<>. 
44Qw.rk, Affair .2!:, Honor, PP• 46-47. 
45consul William Canada to Secretary of State Bryan, April 20, 1914, 
in ™' 1914, P• 477. 
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importantly, the central government could not exist without the customs 
receipts of its largest port. 
The landing of American troops a.t Veracruz was made on April 21 in 
46 the face of opposition that was stiff and unexpected. However, in 
spite of this opposition, the action was success.tul, an:i the United States 
took control of the port. President Wilson expected the action to be 
condoned, if not applauded, by the Constitutionalists as it appeared in 
their best interests. He was mistaken, and his hopes that the action 
would not be "misunderstood" or "misconstrued" by the revolutionaries 
were not realized.47 Venustia.no Carranza. ma.de his opposition known the 
day a~er the port was taken; in a. letter to Wilson he condemned the 
seizure a.s viola.ting the national sovereignty of Mexico. The rebel lead-
er invited the United States to suspend hostilities, evacuate the port 
and submit complaints to the Constitutional Provisional Government for 
mediation.48 This attitude prevailed among most other Constitutionalists 
except Pancho Villa, who stated that as far as he was concerned the 
United States could hold Veracruz so tight that not even water could get 
in.49 
The reply of the Constitutionalists was embarrassing to President 
Wilson, who now found that the use or force and loss of American lives 
46Henry Cabot Lodge, lll1t Senate £!S! ~ I.sague (New Yorks Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1925), pp. 17-18. 
47secretary of state Bryan to Special Agent George C. Carrothers, 
April 21, 1914, in ~' 1914, p. 480. 
48Special. Agent Carrothers to Secretary or State Bryan, April 22, 
1914, in mm, lfil., pp. 483-484. 
49Special. Agent Carrothers to Secretary of State Bryan, April 23, 
1914, in .m[R, 19!!t, PP• 485-486. 
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was not applauded by the Mexican rebels or anyone else. An avenue of es~ 
cape was offered him i n late April when the ABC countries -- Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile -- offered their services as mediators.50 The offer 
was eagerly accepted and a conference arranged, only to find that not one 
of the interested parties could even agree on the issues to be arbitra-
ted. The United States considered the problem to be one of stabilizing 
the internal situation of Mexico; to Fmerta it was a matter of ridding 
his country of foreign troops and collecting the port revenues so neces-
sary for his survival. Carranza denied the legality of the entire con-
ference and re:f'used to send delegates or to be bound by its decisions . 
The meetings dragged on and on, and each day saw the diminution of 
Huerta's control over Mexico. The Constitutionalists were gaining as the 
federal :f'unds were slipping away. On July 14, 1914, Fmerta resigned his 
position and departed ror France. Wilson's policy of "watchful waiting" 
had achieved its goal, but not by merely watching and waiting. The ques-
tion may have been li.ttle more than a choice of good or bad, but the 
people involved had not made the choice.51 
Despite the fall of Fmerta, the Constitutionalist victory was a 
hollow one. Without an outside force as a focal point to contend wit h, 
the new rebel forces became aware of their heterogeneity.52 When its 
leaders paused and looked around, they found little rapport or personal 
friendship among themselves. This situation can be blamed on 
50cline, United States !!:!9. Mexico, p. 160. 
51The ironic points of interest were that this conference did not 
concern itself with the ~isputed salute which had precipitated the in-
vasion, while the Ypiranga and its cargo reached Fmerta•s forces in spite 
of all the precautions. See Baker, Wilson, IV, p. 349 and Quirk, Affair 
£!:, Honor, pp. 150-151. 
52Brandenburg, Modern Mexico, p. 53. 
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personalities, with the differences between Villa, Zapata and Carranza as 
one source of blame; but this view i s only superficial. The root of the 
disagreement rested in the fact that no basis for the revolutionary move-
ment had been laid. A er:, for government that was constitutional and 
legal was sufficient to arouse the patriotic zeal and anger of the 
people, but once emotion had cooled sanething much more firm and definite 
was required: a clear and precise revolutionary program. It did not ex-
ist except in the minds of each of the rebel leaders. Mexico found her-
self facing rule by one of three individuals who had served well and long 
without agreeing on the principles they were serving. Were the battles 
fought for the moderate middle-class ideas of Carranza? Did men die to 
bring the lower classes to the fore and t~n the country over to them? 
Had it all been for land redistribution with the naive assumption that 
such redistribution would dissolve all barriers? No one knew, and a con~ 
ference of revolutionary leaders was called in the hope that discussion 
and debate would prevent the use of the battlefield as arbiter. 
The Aguascalientes Convention of the Constitutionalist forces, which 
began in October, 1914, did not resolve the divisive issues. An uncom-
promisi ng air permeated the proceedings as strong-minded men who had 
found common ground in war could mt do so in peace. When the Villist as 
and the Zapatistas united to elect a Provisional President who did not 
meet the approval of Carranza, he withdrew to Veracruz and prepared to 
defend his title of "First Chief ... 53 With. him. wen~ Alvaro Obreg,n, whose 
military genius was priceless to Carranza•s success. 
The intra-revolutionary strife forced Carranza to seek popular 
53Acting Secretary of State Robert Lansing to Consul Canada, Febru.-
ary 6, 1915, in .fBm, ~' p. 651. 
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support for his leadership. Thus he declared a "pre-constitutional" 
period and ruled by decree. These edicts attacked the problems that lay 
at the heart of the revolution. They included the abolishment of the 
I 
hated jefes politicos in the provinces of Mexico, declared enforceable 
the laws already on the books to outlaw peonage, legalized divorce, and 
announced shorter hours and higher wages for labor • .54 These proclama-
tions were more liberal than the man who issued them, and the question 
arises whether they could be enforced since Carranza did not control 
enough of Mexico to do so. Their purpose was propagandistic, and they 
are not to be understood as characteristic or indicative of the "First 
Chief's" philosophy.55 
By the middle of 1916, Carranza had eliminated the factions that op-
/ posed him. Obregon had hammered at both Villa and Zapata until they re-
treated to their local areas where they could irritate but not endanger 
Constitutionalist control. With victory came the necessity of the£!!:.-
rancistas to legitimize their struggle on whatever basis they chose. In 
September, 1916, a constitutional convention was called. The delegates 
to this meeting were popularly elected, and there was only one require-
ment to their being seated -- they had to take an oath of loyalty to Car-
ranza's Plan of Guadalupe. This, in effect, made the gathering little 
more than a "Constitutionalist Party Convention."56 
The result of the convention was the new constitution promulgated 
the following year. This was not a nebulous, hurriedly written plan, but 
a :f\ill.-scale revolutionary document that incorporated most of the hopes 
.54Gruening, Mexico !E.!! Heritage, p. 99. 
55ciine, United States _!!!! Mexico, p. 137. 
56Gruening, Mexico .!!!9. Heritage, p. 99. 
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and grievances that had initiated the first revolutionary wave in 1910. 
The forces in Mexican society that had for so long stood outside the pale 
of authority were noted arxi provisions ma.de for their control. '!he Church 
was shorn of all power and prestige other than those of a strictly defined 
religious nature. Faith itself was to be a matter of individual con-
science, and each person was given the right to "embrace the religion of 
his choice."57 With the realization that those who educate, control, it 
was written that education would be "entirely apart from any religious 
doctrine." The land problem that had crippled the real growth and pros-
perity of the nation was corrected in an article proclaiming that all 
ownership of land within the borders. of Mexico was now restored to the 
state, which in turn granted it to private owners.58 This provision was 
expanded to include the valuable mineral rights which had resulted in the 
exploitation of Mexico by outsiders.59 Outside capital could still enter 
the country, but the real property possessed by the foreigners was to be 
regulated by the same rules that applied to native property owners. 
Aliens also gave up the right to invoke the protection of their govern-
ment in all disputes arising over such ownership. 60 The constitution 
clearly defined the relationship between employers and employees con-
earning working conditions, hours and wages. Rights were extended to 
these groups to organize unions or associations as well as to strike and 
57Am.os J. Peaslee (ed.), Constitutions of Nations (4 vols.; Concord, 
New Hampshire: Rumford Press, 1950), II, p. m. 
58Ibid. 
59 o• Shaughnessy, Diplomat• s ~' p. 471. 
60.An::irew N. Cleven, "Some Social Aspects of the Mexican Constitution 
of 1917," Hispanic Am.erican Historical Review, IV (August, 1921), 478-
479. 
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to have lock-outs.61 The liberties of all citizens were defined and 
clarified, and the responsibility of the individuals to the states, and 
vice-versa, were defined. The document concluded with a clause stating 
its non-revocability; even if the nation was in revolution, the constitu-
tion was still in effect.62 The Mexican revolution at last had created 
a base. 
Peace and security did mt follow the promulgation of the Constitu-
tion of 1917 or the inauguration of Ve:rmstiano Carranza as the first 
president thereunder on March 12, 1917. The same conservative groups 
that had held Mexico in chains for so long still existed. It would take 
more than a piece of paper and revolutionary ideas to destroy their power . 
The Constitution of 1917, like most constitutions, was open to interpre-
tation. It mentioned nothing of a time limit in which its provisions 
should be put into effect. The President, who could have greatJ.y in-
creased the speed of the process, did not approve of the constitution be-
cause of its radical nature and was slow in carrying out its articles. 
Indeed, on two occasions he made unsuccessful attempts to modify it t o 
meet his original proposals. 63 As the dissident sectors of Mexican so-
ciety prepared to take advantage of the guarantee given to them in 1917, 
they found themselves checked by the President. Organized labor struck, 
only to be declared an enemy of the govermnent and suppressed.64 The 
peasant farmer awaited the redistribution of land, only to find the 
61Peaslee, Constitutions, II, pp. 4.54-455. 
62 Ibid., P• 459. 
63stanley E. H:1.lton, "The Church State Dispute over F.ducation in 
Mexico from Carranza to Cardenas," '!he .Americas, XXI (October, 1964) , 
167. -
640ru.ening, Mexico !!!9, Heritage, P• 338. 
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process slow; it would be several years before his wants could be met. 65 
The promises for education were not put into effect; the facilities for 
education actually seemed to be decreasing, with critics claiming money 
for the education program was going to keep Carranza in power. Indeed, 
the budget showed that more money was spent in the Department of War and 
Marine than in all others combined.66 Still the people waited for the 
promises that had been made them. 
Carranza was making the same mistakes that Madero had made in 1910. 
He was trying to carry out social and economic reforms by cleaning up 
the political situation. He did remove the people of the old Diaz regime 
from the government and replace them with representatives of the revo-
lution, but this did not aid the people. The military was also curtailed 
and controlled, but the people were still hungry and landless. As 1920 
rolled around it was obvious that the President was getting more and more 
dictatorial. He had disregarded election formalities and had imposed his 
candidates as state governors. 67 The revolutionary leaders waited as they 
remembered the last round or intra-revolutionary fighting and the damage 
it had done to the country. Then on April 9, 1919, Emiliano Zapata was 
assassinated. It could not be absolutely proven that Carranza had planned 
the murder, but circumstantial evidence seemed to indicate that he was in-
volved. The revolutionaries shuc!ldered; if the President could M11rder 
Zapata, then the same fate could befall them. The M11tterings of revolt 
were heard again. This murmur became a roar of anger when Carranza 
65John W. F. Ml.es, Yesterday in Mexico: A. Chronicle of the Revolu-
~' !2l:.2,-~ (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), pp.99-100. 
66Thomas E. Gibbon, Mexico Under Carranza (New York: Doubleday, Page 
and Co., 19l9), pp. 24, 29. 
67Herbert I. Priestly, ~ Mexican Nation: ! History (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1924), p. 443. 
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attempted to designate a puppet to follow him as president. 
The mover of the new revolt was Alvaro Obreg!n, the man most re-
/ sponsible for placing Carranza in power. To Obregon, the President was 
making the same mistakes that had been made in the past. The country 
was not allowed to "liberate itself from its liberators."68 The result 
was a contirmation of the old repression under a new name and oppressor. 
Alvaro Obregtn declared himself a candidate for the presidential election 
of 1920 and toured the country seeking popular support. In each area he 
visited, Obregon always managed to talk to the military commanders and 
explain to them that it was their duty as part of the revolutionary army 
to stop Carranza from imposing his candidate as president. The result 
was the Plan of Agua Meta issued by a group ef Sonoran generals. The 
plan proclaimed that Carranza had made a travesty of popil.ar rule and by 
imposing his governors had violated the sovereignty of the states. Peace-
ful. means to prevent this imposition had failed; force now had to be used. 
The revolutionary generals were so quick to follow this declaration that 
this movement earned the title of "the strike of the army men."69 
Carranza tried to do again what had been so successful. for him in 
the stormy days after the fall of lmerta. He placed fai thf'ul. officials 
and the contents of the national treasury on a train and departed for 
Veracruz. In the state of Puebla the train ran into broken tracks, which 
forced the travelers to mount horses in their journey to the north. On 
May 27, 1920, the President of Mexico was killed in the small village of 
Tlaxcalantongo while sleeping on the mu.d fioor of a peasant hut. He was 
not a victim of counter-revolution or reaction; the revolution had made 
68Du.lles, Yesterday !!l Mexico, P• 25. 
69Ib id., 33. 
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him its leader and then had removed him.7° 
The death of Venustiano Carranza marked the end or the Mexican 
revolution in its active and most bloody aspects. There would still be 
insurrections and insurgents who talked of overthrowing the government, 
and some even tried. ~t the old anger and passion was gone. Men could 
no longer be stirred to combat by speeches that ended with the cry of 
"tierra y libertad." They were quickly approaching the point of having 
both. For ten years revolution had thundered across the nation, and its 
innocent victims had remained as a warning to future movements. Mexico 
had her revolution, and she wanted no more. The people now desired the 
benefits that had been flaunted before them for so long. A decade of 
surgery had been performed, and the nation had tired of blood-letting. 
The patient required peace and time to heal. 
70Brandenbu.rg, Modern Mexico, p. 59. 
CHAPTER II 
"SO FAR FROM GOD ••• " 
FRANCISCO MADERO AND UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY, 1910-1913 
The Mexican Revolution was an event or the twentieth century, but 
its pattern was as old as discontent. There was no straight and clearly 
I 
discernible route from the overthrow of Porfirio Diaz to the ''insti tu .. 
tionalization" or revolutionary doctrines. It was a long, paintul and 
laborious task with all the set-backs and reversals that are concomitants 
or forceful and violent change. As the path veered and wandered, there 
were occasional groups of individuals who no longer felt safe or com-
fortable within the confines of revolutionary consensus. To escape from 
real or imagined punishment for their respective heresies, they fled to 
t~e United States and from there plotted, propagandized and pressured for 
acceptance of their ideas and plans for the future or their countryo The 
effect and consequence of their actions was as much a problem for the 
nation to which they fled as for Mexico. 
There was nothing unique or unusual in refugees seeking a protective 
haven in the United States. A cursory examination of United States-
Mex:t.can relations shows that a large part of the interplay between 1910-
1915 could point to a long, diverse and undeniable historical precedent 
for their actions. Even Porfirio n!az, whose iron regime precipitated 
the revol:ijtion, came to power in 1876 from a base located in Texas and 
23 
24 
faced movements from that ~rea and others.1 
The entrance of the United states into the Mexican milieu of the 
early twentieth century was not th~ result of chance or unfortunate acci-
dent. It can be explained in part by geography, in that this country 
and Mexico share a border exceeding 1,400 miles in length. It is no 
natural boundary with physical barriers to explain its location, but 
rat~er a negotiated, arbitrary line; in many areas it can be crossed by 
merely taking another step. The Rio Grande extends over more than one-
half' its length, but it is nomally easily forded and provides only a 
slight hindrance to the determined traveler. Once the border was crossed 
the Mexican fugitive could find neutrality laws that were extremely vague 
and border patrols that were practically non-existent; both circumstances 
would be necessary to the mccess of his venture. 2 
There were a large number of people in the United states who showed 
an active interest in Mexico and were not entirely ignorance of the revo-
lution and its implications for them. This was particularly true_ of 
those individuals who stood to gain or lose by the events to the south. 
The border inhabitants expressed an interest for a variety of reasons. 
There are several cities that are located astride the boundary line and 
are .part Mexican, part American. Any activity that affected the Mexican 
portion of the city would have similar results on-its counterpart. This, 
by necessity, made the turbulent affairs below the border a point or 
considerable interest, since military actions often occurred within 
lcharles c. Cumberland, "Mexican Revolutionary Movements from Texas, 
1906-1912," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LII (January, 191.19), ~~1. 
2J~ Fred Rippy, Jose Vasconcelos and Guy stevens, American Policies 
Abroad: Mexico (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 10 and · 
!!!'!~Times, February 13, 1915, p. 8. 
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eyesight, and United States citi.zens on the border were oftentimes on the 
casualty lists. The attention of Americans was heightened by a bond of 
sympathy between them and the Mexican revolutionaries. All of the border 
states had at one time been controlled by Mexico, and the inhabitants 
prided themselves on break~g away from what they considered to be a de-
generate political body. Some border s.tates had only recently received 
statehood and .felt that their closeness to the .frontier made them more 
aware of the true meaning of democracy. Both .factors tended to make 
these people eager to aid revolutionaries, occasionally to the point of 
breaking the law. It would have been difficult for Americans in the 
area, so strong in their democratic faith and so aware of the usetulness 
or revolt, to deny the necessity or obligation or others to follow suit. 
The business community was directly involved and concerned with the 
events in Mexico. A total of $1,000,000,000 invested in Mexico and a 
fear or the anti-American tendencies of the revolution made American r1-
nanciers more than a little anxious when the blind passion or quick 
change appeared. Violence is bad for business, but. revolution can be 
disastrous, and the outcries of American businessmen were among the first 
to be heard. They expected their money, property, and lives to be pro-
tected and with good reason; for President Taft had stated on December 7, 
1909, that a citizen of' the United States remained so no matter where he 
resided, and it was not to be expected that he relinquish his "personal 
or property rights" when in a foreign country. 3 
In addition, there were other segments of the Am.e~ican population· 
who made their preferences known on how the Mexican situation should be 
3James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation g! !!!!. Messages .!!!.2. Papers 
of the Presidents (11 vols.; Washington, D. C.: Blreau of National 
iiterature, 1931), X, P• 7795. . 
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handled. The Catholic Church feared the anti-religious and anti-clerical 
wrath or the rebels; labor lea~ers, n9tably Samuel Gompers, from time to 
time spoke of the universality of their movement and the right of the 
Mexican laborer to share in it; and the USllal assortment of people who 
pictured revolution as something dashing and romantic, filled with bloody 
charges and the companionship of the campfire after a d81' of blood-
letting. All had to be taken into account if the government of the United 
' ' 
states was to realize a Mexican policy that was supportable and supported. 
The exile groups had either to counteract or utilize this assorted ideal-
ism and materialism to convince the officials in Washington of the popu-
lar support tor their cause. It was not a task for the meek or weak-
hearted. 
As already stated, there had been a long procession of refugees flee-
ing from Mexico to the United States. The precursor in terms or operative 
method and intent to those under discussion was that of Ricardo Fl.ores 
I 
Magon. In 1904 this anarchist and labor organizer was already preparing 
a philosophical basis for Madero' s revolt in Mexico. His base of opera-
tion was initially sQUthern Texas, although he eventually relocated in 
St. Louis, Missouri. From here he issued "El Programa del Partido 
Liberal, ,,4 the first of the important revolutionary plans. Flores , 
Magon•s faction received support and financial aid from Francisco Madero, 
a member of a wealthy, landed family of northern Mexico, to keep propa-
ganda pouring into the restless country. This aid was particularly im-
portant in helping finance the chief propaganda organ, ~ireneracion, a 
newspaper printed in Spanish and distributed in both the United States 
4 
Cumberland, Southwestern Historical Quarterl;t:, LII, '.302. 
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and Mexico.5 This publication had considerable influence in causing the 
large number of labor strikes of 1906 in Mexico.6 For more than five 
years Flores Magin was p11rsued from state to state by federal authorities 
and was eventually arrested for violation of the neutrality laws.7 Short ... 
ly before his arrest, he and Madero had disagreed over the opportuneness 
of revolution, and he was no longer getting money from the future rebel.8 
This incident of exile activity in the United States received little 
popular support due to the fact that its leader espoused ideas of an-
archism and internaUonal organization -- both of which were unacceptable 
to.the majority of Americans. The only open support of any significance 
' 
was from Samuel Gompers, who worked for Flores Ma.g,n•s release whenever 
he was imprisoned; but this was done in the name of labor rather than 
revolution.9 It is impossible to prove, but quite plausible, that Madero 
learned from his predecessor's experiences. Madero never spoke of a uni-
versal need for revolution and always kept mis utterances in vague and 
emotional terms which the American people could sympathize with and 
support. 
Francisco Ma.dero's exile activities began on October 7, 1910, when 
he crossed the bridge at Laredo dressed in the clothes of a railroad 
5stanley R. Ross, Francisco l• Madero: Apostle ,2!: Mexican Democracy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), P• 42. 
6Wllliam M. Rossiter, "Mexican-American Relations, 1913-1920. A Re ... 
appraisal," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1953), 
pp. 8-9. . 
7Ibid. 
8Ross, Madero, P• 43. 
9 Rossiter, "Mexican-American Relations," P• 12. 
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mecha.nic.10 From Laredo he journeyed to San Antonio, Texas, where he es-
tablished a "Junta Revolucionaria." A few days later he issu.ed a-procla-
mation entitled "To The American People." In this first pronouncement on 
United States soil the rebel leader asked for nothing more than "hospi-
tality which al1 f'ree peoples have always accorded to those f'rom other 
countries who strive for liberty. ,,11 There was no radical statement here, 
for Madero was no ~-kept radical haranguing people w.1.th ideas that op-
. I 
posed the tenor of" the times. In a word, he was no Ricardo Flores Magon. 
The new rebel was a mentQer or a wealthy and influential-family w.1.th con-
nections in the United States and who always conducted him.self w.1.th a 
qui.et and restrained dignity that lent po~ar sympathy to his movement.12 . . . 
The mayor of El Paso stated some years later that 95i ot his consistuency 
I 
supported Madero.13 Flores Magon could be hounded; Madero would have to 
be handled. 
There was little doubt from the beginning that Madero was equipping 
a revolution and using the United States as a base of operation and 
sou.roe ot supply f'or arms and anmm.nition. In his "Plan of San Inis 
/ 
Potosi",he had proclaimed November 20 as the starting date for his in-
surrection, and agents were active in preparing for that date. As early 
10 Ross, Madero, p. 112. 
11Papers Relating :!:2. the Foreign Relations .!!!:, ~ United states, 
J:m. (Washington, D. c.: Government Printing Office, 1920), P• 350. Here-
inafter cited as PRFR and the proper year. ---
12°?.berland, Southwestern Historical Qqarterl7, LII, 307 arjd Feder-
ico .. ~llez Garza, !!, Revoluci~n Mexicana. ~ Contribuci6n Poll tico-
li teriria (Mexico City: Talleres Tipogrffico~, 1936), p. 223. 
13u. s. Congress, Senate, Revolutions in Mexico, 62nd 9ong., 2nd -~ 
Sess., 1913,--P• 452 and )blfael Mart!nez, carI'os M. Samper and Gral. J,se 
P. Lomelin, !!, Revoluci6n z .ml Hombres (Mexico City: Talleres Tipogra-
ticos de "KL Tiempo," 1912), p. 122. · · 
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as November 14, Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson relayed the message that 
there were revolutionaries gathering war material in the United States, 
and that the Mexican government would be appreciative of all steps to 
prevent the continuance of such activities.14 Two days later the n!az 
regime was positive that these men were led by Madero. A suspected rebel 
in Mexico had been arrested, and a search of his house revealed commis-
sions signed by Don Francisco in his capacity of "President !9.. interim 
and Commander of the Revolutionary Army of Mexico.nl5 The reaction of 
the State Department to this information was non-committal. It informed 
the Mexican government that all complaints of rebel activities would be 
forwarded to the Department of Justice with the recommendation they be 
investigated as quickly as possible.16 The Mexican government was also 
requested to provide all the evidence it possessed pertaining to such 
action.17 As November 20 approached the complaints described the massing 
of bands along the border in preparation for the expected imrasion.18 On 
I 
the aforementioned date Consul Edwards at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz reported 
that Madero had crossed the border into Mexico.19 
The first step in the revolution was not only a failure, it was 
14American Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to Secretary of State Phi-
lander c .. Knox, November 14, 1910, in .f.BI!h 1911, PP• 358-359. 
15same to Same, November 16, 1910, in ~' 19ll, P• 326. 
16secretary of State Knox to American Ambassador Wilson, November 19, 
1910, in PRFR, 1911, P• 364. 
17 Acting Secretary of State James Adee to American Ambassador Wilson, 
November 19, 1910, in !!r,R, 1911, p. 364. 
18Mexican Ambassador Francisco de la Barra to Secretary of State 
Knox, November 19, 1910, in PRFR1 1911, P• 364. 
19American Consul Ellsworth at Ciudad Porfirio nCaz to Secretary of 
State Knox, November 22, 1910, in~' !211, p .. 365. 
30 
almost a laughable one. One can see the rebel leader crossing into Mexico 
fully expecting his supporters to rise up and join him ,a masse. Such was 
not the case. No force of any size awa,-ted him, and again Madero fled 
over the border. It was not defeat but merely postponement. Running low 
on funds, the revolutionary leader disbanded his organization in San 
Antonio and traveled to New Orleans in the hope of entering his country 
from that port.20 
The days spent in New Orleans were barren, but Madero believed in 
himself and his cause. Not even the condition of unaccustomed poverty 
could diminish his confidence in the inevitability of a Mexico without 
iaz. 21 While he was in Louisiana, federal authorities in San Antonio 
had been instructed to arrest him, believing he was still in the area. 22 
The United States atto:rney in that district stated that he lacked suf-
ficient cause for such action unless Mexico could provide more evidence. 23 
.Since the Mexican government could not provide the information, Madero re-
turned to Texas in late December still free and active. 
The protests by Mexican officials against rebel activities in the 
· United States did not abate. The demand for action continued through 
January and into Febl'llary of 1911, with the United States government in-· 
sisting it would prosecute all violators of the neutrality laws if the 
20Cumberland, Southwestern Historical Quarterl.y, LII, 310. 
21Living conditions were so bad .f'or Madero while in New Orleans that 
the once aristocratic rebel was reduced to repairing his own shoes. His 
spirits remained high, and while his brother worried about rood he thought 
or men who could serve in his cabinet when his revolution triumphed. See 
Ross, Madero, P• 129. 
22Acting Attorney General J. A. Fowler to Secretary or State Knox, 
November 30, 1910, in PRFR2 !21!, P• :3?0. 
23Attorney General G. w. Wickersham to Secretary of State Knox, De-
cember 2, 1910, in l!!!, !m:,, P• 371. 
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violations could be verifiedo It would not prosecute on reports of 
l"Wllors, and "mere word, written or spoken" was no offense.24 By Febru-
ary 4 the obvious had become blatant, and authorities in this country 
could no longer deny that Madero was indeed breaking the neutrality laws 
in preparing to launch military expeditions into a friendly country from 
the United states.25 A warrant was is!Slled for his arrest.26 Meanwhile 
the revolution had gained momentum without Mexico; the impending arrest 
and a belief that he could be of more use in his country prompted Madero 
to hold a hurried meeting with his officex-s and then to cross into Mexi-
co. San Antonio rE:3mained the headquarters of the Provisional Government 
and still served as the Sllpplier of guns and a.mmanition for the re-
bellion.27 
In conducting operations for the revol'ti;tion it was mandatory that its 
leader remain on or near the border. This location greatly facili ta.ted 
the solution of problems that might arise within Mexico and allowed fre .. 
quent meetings of the commander and his subordinates. Bu.t there was cru ... 
cial and demanding work to be done in other parts of the United states. 
The Sllccess of this revolution, and all others in Mexico, depended on the 
attitude of the government in Washington, and it was necessary to have 
men there who could speak well and convincingly for the cause. Therefore, 
24Secretary of State K'nox to Mexican Ambassador Francisco de la 
Barra, January 23, 1911, in~, 1911, P• '.393. 
25The Neutrality Laws state that anyone who prepares and, or initi-
ates acts or aggression from within the United States against nations 
friendly to the United states is subject to a large fine.and a.ma.ximu.m 
three year jail sentence. See Section XIII, Appendix A. 
26secretary of State Knox to Mexican C'rlarg( d' Affaires, February 4, 
1911, in f!m, 1911, P• 401. 
27eu.m.berlandt Southwestern Historical Qu.arterl:y, LII, 3180 
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shortly before November 20, 1910, Ernesto ,Fern{ndez y Artega, a long ... time 
friend or the Madero family, was appointed as the rebel spokesman to the 
national govermnent. To avoid the pitfalls or intemational law, Fernan-
dez y Artega took the precaution of retaining a lawyer well versed in 
that field. '!he mission was later supplemented by the addition of Juan 
I Sanchez and. Gustavo Madero, brother of Francisco and financial agent or 
the revolution. 28 
I 
With the collapse or the first abortive attempt to oust Diaz, the 
Maderista junta in Washington was disbanded, as it was neit:ber immediately 
necessary nor monetarily tolerable. On deciding to return to Mexico, the 
rebel leader again recognized the need to have representation in Wa.shingQ 
I I 
ton. This time his choice fell to Dr. Francisco Vasquez Gomez, a noted 
physician and statesman in his own. right. visquez <imez had refused to 
associate with the San Antonio Junta, but as it became more obvious that 
the revolutionary wheel was rolling in Madero•s direction, he decided to 
tollow it. 29 .The t~ men met in El Paso in February or 1911 to arrange a 
working agreement and to mediate their differences. After some pressure, 
the doctor agreed to head the second mission to Washington as chief or 
the "Agency or Revolution... In return he obtained a pledge that Madero 
would not re-enter Mexico.3° This promise was later broken. A secretary 
I I I 
and aide was also chosen to help Vasquez Gomez. This was Jose Vasconcelos, 
who later became one or the leading intellectuals of the revolutionary 
28Garza, !!, Contribuci~n, P• 220. 
29charles CWnberland, Mexican Revolutio~: Genesis Under Madero (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1952), P• 130. 
30 ~ ~ Martinez, et al., Revolucion z Hombres, p., 85. 
movemento3l 
The Revolutionary Agency was established to 1:1erve two essential 
functions. It was to meet with governmental officers on the official 
33 
and unofficial level, ·and argue the rebel cause in the hope of obtaining 
a recognition of belligerency tor the governmento SUch recognition would 
be of little material significance, but would have considerable ettect on 
the morale of the rebels. Ir granted, it would indicate to people within 
Mexico that the rebel.lion was :more than another small-scale insurrection. 
In addition, recognition ot belligerency would imply that cause existed 
for the overthrow ot Diaz and that the Unit~d states was willing to 
recognize a government created by the revolutionaries. 
I 
The second purpose ot the Maderistas in Washington was to keep the 
legitimacy of their purpose before the American people amd to make it 
clear that the movement was the action ot a down-trodden people removing 
the boot of tyranl'JY' trom their throats. The press or the United States 
was, in large part, ,:-esponsible for success in fulfilling this function. 
The revolution itself was news, a:nd the reporters were eager to ~eek 
interviews with the Maderista spokeS111en in the country.32 
In all its duties the agency conflicted with the representatives of 
. . I 
the Portirian government in this country. The Diaz government expended 
large Slltlls or money tor spies to in.filtrate the exiles at work in the 
United States and to betray arm s~pments and smugglers.33 Dr. visquez 
I Gomez had to frustrate this plan as much as possible from his position in 
. '31Jost Vasconcelos, ! ~xican Ul:ysses: A,n AutobiograPhY:, trans. and , 
abridged by w. Rex Crawford moomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), 
PP• 59-60. . 
~2Vasconcel.os, .American Policies, p. 104. 
33vasconcelos, Ul:ysses, pp. 59-60·. 
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Washington and with c,onsiderably less money than the enemy.34 
As mentioned, the chief' f'inancia1 agent or Francisco Madero was his 
brother, Gustavo. Fiscal operations were not confined to a single state 
or area, and Gu.stav.o• s du.ty was deceptively simple -- to solve all fi., 
nanoial difficulties involved in ridding Mexico of nCaz. The Madero 
. . 
family was wealthy in terms of' land, but .it was difficult to convert 
these holdings into liquid assets. Shortly after Francisco had tled to 
Mexico the family estates had been frozen and could not be disposed or 
for cash, while gun sellers insisted on being paid in currency. In 1910 
a loan was negotiated with a Paris banking house by underwriting bonds 
in exchange for railroad rights through Zacatecas.35 By early 1911 much 
of' this :money had already been used in launching the revolution, and Gus-
tavo was placed in the position of' finding mone~ where none was to be 
had. At least one major oil compan;v reportedly offered aid but withdrew 
it when the State Department and Francisco Madero i:ndicated their dis-
approval.36 As nearly as can be determined, the Madero revolution re-
ceived no financial aid of' an;v consequence from the people of' the United 
states or the business co11l111Unity. The si.tuation was so critical at one 
point that the selling of bonds of' the Provisional Govemment was con-
sidered, but this propo.sal was never carried out.37 By May 4, 1911, the 
inability to obtain funds was rapidly nearing the point of' halting the 
rebellion altogether. In this crisis, Gustavo Madero grew careless in 
'.34E. I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico (Boston: LittJ.e, Brown, 
1914), P• 43. - -
35Ibid., P• 48. 
36Howard c. Cline, l'h!!, United States !?!! Mexico (New York: Atheneum, 
1963), P• 123. 
37Ma.rtfnez, et al., Revoluoi&'n z Hombres, P• 220. 
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his attempts to so:J_ve it and was.f~rced to nee to Canada.38 In May 
I Ciudad Juarez f'ell to the rebels, which alleviated some of' the financial 
I 
pressure. A few days later, on May 25, t~ grip of' Diaz on Mexico. com-
pletely collapsed, and the old dictator became an exile in Enrope. 
The months between Ma.~el;'O•s entry into Ml3Xico City on June 7, 1911, 
and his f'ormal election as President of Mexico on October 15 were not 
peacetu.l. Opposition was imediate, if not particularly effective, and 
the United States again served as a sanctuary f'or the.discontented. As 
I 
early as May 29, 1911, four days after the resignation of Diaz, a plot , 
backed by supporters of Diaz was reported in El Paso. One of' the conspira-
tors in:f'omed the United States Secret Service, and the instigators were 
arrested.39 Three months later another remnant ot the Porfiriato, Gener-
al Bernardo Reyes, left Mexico in a disenchanted mood due to the lack or 
support his candidacy for President was receiving. The General's cry of 
rigged elections was evidently more expediency than tra.thtu.l proclama-
tion.!IO For more than a month the government or Mexico was not sure or 
his whereabouts, al though he spent part of the time in Havana and New Or ... 
leans before arriving in Texa.s.41 
By October Reyes had located along the south Texas border amidst 
fears tha.t he was planning another revolution. Not wishing to give the 
General any more publ.iei ty than he already had, Provisional President 
Francisco de la Barra sent his brother to San Antonio to ascertain the 
'.38Garza, m:_ Contribuciln, p. 220. 
39New ~ Times, February 10, 1913, P• 3. 
!K>Ross, Madero, P• 2,54. 
41Ibid. 
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plans or Reyes and attempt to conciliate any grievances.42 He found that 
the :recalcitrant General tfB.S indeed planning an attempt to oust the 
government in Mexico and that he was not in the least interested in con-
ciliation. This intorma.tion forced the Mexican government to give the 
threat or.f'icia.1 recognition. On November 10, the Mexican Ambassador, 
· Crespo y ~rt!ne,z, :reported tha. t. his government had "serious reason for 
believing" that Reyes and a band or followers were plotting an invasion 
in San Antonio and that suoh an action would undoubtedly violate the neu ... 
tra.lity laws of the United States. 43 Five days later the. "reason .for 'be-
lieving" had hardened to "de.finite information" which included the col-
lusion of certain Texas of'f'icials, among them the sheriff' of Webb Countyo 
The Mexican goverment insisted that it ~s capable of' handling any action 
taken by the Re;v!'stas bu.t recommended a liberal interpretation or the neu ... 
trality laws to :nip the :movement in .its infancy. 44 The State Department0s 
. I 
answer was identical with those made to the Diaz regime during Madero•s 
action; the suspects would be arrested if' their movements could be .fact-
ually proven as infractions of existing legislation.45 The Maderistas in 
this country provided the required evidence, and on November 18, the 
General, the Sheriff and other less notable participants were arrested, 
wbile the confiscation or arms started.46 
42.American .Ambassador Wilson to Secretary or state Knox, October 27, 
1911, in .!!!!, !211, P• 520. 
4'.3Mexican .Ambassador Gd.lberto Crespo y Ma.rtfnez to Secretary of State 
Knox, November 10, 1911, in PRFR, 1911, P• 521. 
44American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of state Knox, November 15, 
1911, in !!m,, J:m., P• 52.1. 
145secretary or State Knox to Mexican Ambassador Gilberto Crespo y 
Martinez, November 17, 1911, in PRFR, ~, P• 522. 
46.American C~nsul Garrett at Neuva ~;e~o to Secretary of State Knox, 
November 18, 1911 in ibid. and Same to Same, November 19, 1911, Po 522. 
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Two days after this arrest Rayes was rel.eased on a bond of $5,000 
and placed under surveillanoe.47 He was also warned not to cross the 
border into Mexico under aey circu.mstanc~s.48 -The General pleaded w.ith 
Robert La Follette, the Republican Seruttor :from Wisconsin, to intel"Vene . . . 
in his behalf, but to no avail. All hope of help from high governmental 
circles was smashed when President Taft stated unequivocally that no in-
vasion of Mexican territory would be ~rm:itted from the United States.49 
Realizing that the United states was less than warm to his cause, Reyes 
crossed the border in December and found the people of Mexico equally 
cool to his blandishments. On Christmas Day he surrendered to a small 
band of rurales and was transported to Mexico City for .trial.50 
Despite of'fi~ial ~rot_~sts to the contrary, there were differences in 
the manner in which the United states handled Madero and Reyes. Reyes 
had been in this country only a short period before.he was investigated 
as to his motives and was arrested. Madero had been working along the 
border for months before the same occurred to him, and he had always had 
:free access into Mexico. Reyes.had ma~e no hostile political movements 
toward Mexico, and unless the interpretation of the laws had been :modi-. 
tied, there was no case for arresting him. All this being true, Presi ... 
dent Taft was perhaps overstating the tacts a bit when on December 7, 
while reporting to Congress the conditions along the border, he proudly 
announced that the United states was doing no more tor Madero than it had 
47 Ross, Madero, P• 255. 
48Cumberland, Genesis, p. 188. 
49nxtd. 
50.American .Ambassador WJJ.son to Secretary ot State Knox, December 30, 
19ll, in,!!!!, lm,, P• 525. 
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Reyes• revolution was ~n irritant to the Mexican government and 
little else. He represented the "old Mexico" of iron rule, and the trend 
was toward less severe government .. There was another movement partially 
concurrent with the Reyistas that did show signs of producing serious 
consequences. This revolt was led by members or the first revolution, 
and their claim to speak for reform was clearly as good as Ma.dero•s. The 
old cynical and defiant axiom of revolution was rearing its head: united 
in opposition, divided in victory. 
Upon entering Mexico City Madero started the long task of finding 
individuals to serve as his advisors after his expected victory in the 
national election of October 15, 1911. There were relatively few men 
available who were capable of tul.filling the requisites or these offices. 
I / 
Among this small number were the two Vasquez Gomez brothers, Francisco 
and Emilio; the former had served as Ma.dero•s confidential agent in 
Washington. &dlio was selected as Minister of Government and Francisco 
as Minister of Public Instruction. It was also generally assumed that 
the Public Instruction Minister would be the vice-presidential candidate 
in the elections. A split between the brothers and Madero was developing 
long before the appointment, but the soon-to-be president thought he could 
bridge it. He and Dr. vfsquez ~ez had some misunderstandings during 
the revolution itself' over when action should start and over the fina1 
goals of the revolution. This was widened by Madero•s appointment of 
some members or the old ri.az regime to the ad interim cabinet. 52 Disputes - . 
51President William H. Taft to Congress, December 7, 1911, in PRFR, 
J.m., PP• xv-xvio 
52 Ross, Madero, Po 206. 
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with Emilio followed a like pattern, with the added fact that he openly 
encouraged the rebel chiefs to oppose Madero unless the le~der removed 
all vestiges of the Porfiriato from the new government.53 These con-
fiicts could not be resolved, and Emilio, after resigning his position. 
urder pressure, went to San Antonio and starting issuing anti-Madero 
propaganda. 
From·San Antonio Emilio circulated a letter to his followers in 
Mexico announcing that Madero was certain to fall, which made it their 
duty to take up the l'eins of government before other less acceptable 
groups did.54 This was followed on December 29, 1911, by an open invita-
tion for all the discontented revolutionaries to join the movement.55 In 
mid-February Emilio proclaimed himself Provisional President56 and stepped 
up his propaganda, to the displeasure of the Mexican government.57 The 
government in Mexico and United States Ambassador Wilson recommended that 
he either be gagged or expelled from the United States in the hope of set-
tling the tense situation in Mexioo.58 The case was investigated, bllt as 
there was nothing to indicate that the law had been broken, the Mexican 
government was reminded that Madero had been able to do the same while in 
residence in the United States two years earlier.59 
53CUmberland, Genesis, p. 159. 
54Ross, Madero, p. 256. 
55eumberland~ Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LII, 318-319. 
56American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, February 18, 
1912, in .f!l!l, 1912, P• 721. 
57Ibj.d., January 6, 1912, p .. 710. 
58Ibido, February 27, 1912, p. 727 and February 28, 1912, p .. 728 .. 
59Acting Seoretar~ of State Huntington Wilson to Mexican Ambassador 
Gilberto Crespo y Martinez, February 29, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, P• 729. 
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Late in February the Vasguistas in Mexico had succeeded in capturing 
the border city of Ciudad Jufrez. 60 This was the same city that had been 
so crucial in the success of Ma.dero's rebellion and it appeared that the 
revolution had gone 1ull cycle. Again, the Mexican government and the 
United states argued, reasoned am pleaded in a clash over the rights of 
rebels to get arms in this country. '!he Madero government first requested 
that all exportation by way of Ciudad Ju!.rez be halted, only to be in-
formed by Acting Secretary of State Huntington Wilson that there was no 
reason for altering the stam taken when Madero held it during his re-
bellion.61 Moreover, the question involved the broader issue of recog-
nition of the belligerency rights of the rebels.62 According to inter-
/ national law, Ciudad Juarez, thQugh held by insurgents, was still of-
ficially in the hands of the central government; thus the United states 
refused to take an;v action +n isolating this entry city between the 
United States am Mexico.63 The only alternative, following this line 
of reasoning, would have been to recognize the rebel forces as belli-, 
gerents am then boycott Ciudad Juarez. This course was unacceptable to 
the Madero government. 
Finding no legal basis for their demands, the :Mexican government 
turned to logic and cajolery by arguing that unless the arms shipments 
I through Ciudad Juarez were stopped, the government in Mexico might fall 
and the United States would be forQed to intervene; therefore, why not 
6o American Consul F.dwards at Ciudad Juf.rez to Secretary of State Knox, 
February 27, 1912, in PRFR1 ~' P• 882. . ' 
61Acting Secretary of state Wilson to American .Ambassador Wilson, 
March 1, 1912, in~,~, p. 729. 
62Ibid., February 29, 1912, P• 729. 
63Ibid., March 4, 1912, p. 736. 
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halt the movement before t hat poi nt was reached?64 The State Department 
refused to base present policy on future contingency and, while expressing 
its sympathy, insisted it was a Mexican problem which Mexico would be re-
quired to solve. The United States had neutrality laws, and all it could 
do was prosecute the violators of these laws, leaving other problems to 
the solution or the responsibile nation.65 This Olympian detachment was 
more than the harassed Mexican Ambassador Crespo y Mart(nez could endure, 
am with an anger evident even in his cordial response he recounted the 
attempts of his government to protect Americans and their property from 
rebels using guns purchase~ in the United States, and partially led by a 
man lil.o resided in San Antonio. He then charged the United States with 
hiding behirxi its inadequate neutrality laws by claiming they existed and 
thus had to be followed. If the laws were ineffectual, he wrote, they 
should be amended and not apologized for.66 No connection can be proved, 
but three days later, on March 4, 1912, Congress passed a joint resolu-
tion allowing the President to control and divert the shipment of arms to 
countries where violence was aggravated by arms coming from the United 
States.67 
The Vasguistas uprising was in effect the forerunner and "stalking 
horse" of a movanent led by one of Ma.dero•s best fighting commanders, 
Pascual Orozco. Orozco was among the f'irst openly to Sllpport Madero am 
64.American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, March 5, 
1912, in .m[R, !21Z., P• 737 • 
65Acting1Secretary of State Wilson to Mexican Ambassador Gilberto 
Crespo y Ma.rt1nez, Ma.rc>:i 8, 1912, in ~' m2., pp. 740-742. · 
66Mexican Ambassador Gilberto Crespo y Ma.rt!nez to Secretary or 
State Knox, March ll, 1912, in ,m:R, ~, PP• 743-744. 




had been instrumental in the fighting that had toppled Diaz. Though only 
superficially educated, he had a rather exaggerated belief in his ment al 
powers am expected rewards commensurate with his revolutionary contri-
butions and his presumed capability. He wanted to be Governor or Chihua-
hua but was disappointed when Abraham Gonz'1ez won that position. When 
/ 
Gonzalez received an appointment in Madero' s cabinet, Orzico felt he 
should be the one to fill the unexpired term. However, he was again 
passed over for a more qualified man. He eventually received the position 
or comma.mer of the rurales of Chihuahua, but this was a sma.11 and rela-
tively unimportant position. On January 12, 1912, he resigned, and the 
germ or rebellion was growing within him.68 When the Vasguistas took 
Ciudad Jufrez, Orozeo joined the movement in early March. 69 It was in-
evitable that Orozeo wquld gain leadership of the Vasguista forces. The 
fighter has always appealed more to the Mexican people than the intel-
lectual, and Orozco was in Mexico while Fmilio was safe in the United 
states. By early April the rebel chiefs were drifting away from the 
leadership of v:squez Gtmez and were following Orozeo.70 
From the .first the Orozguistas were hostile toward the United States 
for what they considered to be the pro-Madero inclination of the Washing-
ton offieials.71 Yet they were not so .foolish as to believe that their 
rebellion could succeed without the support or the United states, and 
68eumberland, Genesis, pp. 191-192. 
69Secretary or War H. L. Stimson to Secretary or State Knox, March 
4, 1912, in lSm:, !212., P• 736. 
70Ameriean Consul Letcher at Chihuahua to Secretary of State Knox, 
April 7, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, p. 776 and Acting Secretary of State Wilson 
to American Consul Letcher at Chihuahua, April 11, 1912, p. 780. 
71Ameriean Consul Letcher at Chihuahua to Secretary of State Knox, 
April 7, 1912, in !:!f'.R, 1212, P• 776. 
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Orozco was quick to proclaim his friendship72 and ask for recognition of 
belligerency. The request was retused with the result that the Oroz--
guistas decided that such a retusal was a two-sided weapon. Orozco in-
formed the government of the United States that since they did not recog-
nize those areas under rebel control in Mexico, the rebels did not recog-
nize the official status of the American consuls in in~urgent-held 
districts.73 This statement placed .Americans in a position of danger, 
since theoretically they would have no protection. 'lbe State Department 
replied that recognition or no, Americans would be treated humanely and 
in a civilized manner. If not, the Mexican people would answer. 74 This 
response was somewhat stronger than the rebels had anticipated, and they 
backed away. On April 18 Orozco wrote that his action met all the 
standards necessary for belligerency recognition. If the United states 
persisted in denying the obvious, the rebels would continue to deal with 
the consuls accredited to the central government.75 In order that Washing-
ton might better understand the cause of the Orozco rebellion, the leader 
expressed willingness to communicate with the United States government on 
any level and stated his intention of sending a confidential agent to 
confer in his name.76 
On April 20 Manuel L. lujan, Orozco•s agent, arrived in Washington 
72Acting Secretary of State Wilson to American Consul Letcher at 
Chihuahua, April 11, 1912, in ..ffiF.!!, 1912, p. 781. 
73.American Consul Letcher at Chihuahua to Secretary of State Knox, 
April 11, 1912, in _mm, m2., p. 781. 
74Acting Secretary of State Wilson to American Consul Letcher at 
Chihuahua, April 14, 1912, in .ffim, 1912, P• 788. 
75Pascual Orozco, Jr. to Acting Secretary of State Wilson, April 18, 
1912, in PRFR, 1912, P• 795. 
76 6 Ibid., pp. 795-79. 
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and informed the State Department that he exercised full power to confer 
and bargain with the United states government.?? The State Department 
expressed a lack of interest in Senor Lujan and his credentials. He 
later stated that all his conferring was with clerks who blocked his en-
trance to the people he wanted to see.78 
In addition to a confidential agent, Orozco also established a prop-
aganda-disseminating center in New York City. This organization attacked 
Madero by claiming that he had dissipated the financial surplus left by 
I 
Diaz; that he was not the true leader of the revolution but a mere op-
portunist; arxi that Gustavo Madero had stolen large sums of money. 79 The 
charge most popular in Mexico, that Madero was a lackey of the United 
States, was missing in these accusations. All of these were verifiably 
untrue, but Orozco was not interested in truth; he wanted power. 
By May the sp.lit between Vasguistas and Orozguistas was no longer a 
matter of conjecture; it was a fact. F.arly in that month an envoy from 
I 
Orozco offered the Provisional Presidency of Mexico to Emilio Vasquez 
I 
Gomez with the seat of government in the rebel-occupied city of Ciudad 
Jufrez.80 On May 7 Orozco had second thoughts and removed his President 
after a term of less than four days. 81 Emilio returned to San Antonio 
and, without seeming in the least compromised, attacked Orozco and 
??Manuel L. I.njan to Secretary of State Knox, April 20, 1912, in 
ll!m, 1912, P• 799. 
78u. S. Congress, Senate, Revolutions!!'.! Mexico, P• 293. 
79eumberland, Genesis, p. 194. 
80American Consul :Edwards at Ciudad Juarez to Secretary of State 
Knox, May 4, 1912, in PRFR, 1912, P• 809. 
Bl.American Consul Garrett at Nuevo Laredo to Secretary of state 
Knox, May 7, 1912, in ~' 1912, P• 809. 
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82 Madero. wt th the division in the rebel forces consummated, the move-
ment was even less of a threat. The summer of 1912 saw its strength ra-
pidly melt away. 
In September the insurgent forces were so completely snashed that 
Orozco was forced to fiee to the United States, where he was arrested. 
'Ibis arrext was an indication of a stronger line toward rebel activities 
on the border. In October the State Department requested the u. s. De-
partment of War to arrest all rebels .entering the United States from 
Mexico, giving Section XIV of the neutrality laws as the basis.83 It was 
expected that this policy would shore up the tottering Madero government. 
If other justification was required, the State Department added that 
these rebels had consistently taken up anns to molest Americans and their 
property in the war-torn country. 84 As 1912 drew to a close it appeared 
that time had removed some of the old impartiality from the interpreta-
tion of the laws of neutrality. Where no authority could be found to ar-
rest early rebels on the border in 1910, "ample authority" was present in 
1912. 85 The novelty had worn off as border confiicts grew in number. 
There appeared to be a never-ending succession of rebels who operated in 
the area, and United States public opinion grew tired of appeals to 
democratic principles. 
The conditions facing Madero in the first months of 1913 were 
82Cuznberland, Genesis, p. 197. 
' 
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relatively calm, and there was cause for optimism. He was still subject 
to vicious attacks from the Mexican press, but these were of little real 
danger to the growing strength of his regime. The prison in Mexico City 
contained the two rebellious generals, and what harm could they do as 
captives of the govemment? Yet this period of apparent tranquility was 
only superficial. The old ruling order was plotting, and President Taft 
was beginning to have his doubts about the ability of President Madero 
to stabilize and pacify the d,i .ssenting elements. In two months Madero 
would fall, blt the.forces that topple.cf him were predominantly internal. 
The United States would play the role of a spectator presented with an 
accomplished deed. 
CHAPTER III 
"SO NEAR THE UNITED STATES" 
WOODROW WILSON AND THE CON~TITUTIONAUSTS, 191)-1915 
Mexico's hopes of ~voiding the long and bloody path of the typical 
Latin American revolution disappeared with the MUrder of Francisco Ma.-
dero on February 22, 1913. This act turned the country back to the forces 
of reaction. The following two years saw the elements of reform unite in 
defiance and divide in victory as rebellion was replaced by civil war. 
On February 9, 1913, a barracks' revolt engineered by Generals Ber-
/ 
na.rdo Reyes and Felix Diaz erupted in Mexico City. In the ten days that 
ensued, 
I 
''la decena tragic a", the Capital was raked by gunfire as it be-
came little more than a crowded battlefield where shells made no dis-
crimination between participants and non-participants. When the smoke 
cleared a~d the dead and dying were removed from the streets, Victoriano 
Huerta, a bespectacled, restless-eyed remnant of the Porfiriato, emerged 
as the new ruler of Mexico.1 The forces of Madero had been routed and 
the former President MUrdered while being transported from one prison to 
another. 
The dangerous conditions in the capi ta1 city had caused concern in 
Washington for the American citizens located there. To express this con-
cern, battleships were dispatched to Mexican waters in the hope of 
lF.dith O'Shaughnessy, Diplomatic. Days (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1917), P• 102. 
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bringing the people to their senses. 2 Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson re-
quested this action be coi:n,plemented with "drastic and firm instructions" 
which would enabl.e him to negotiate with the parties involved. The re-
quest was denied because officials feared if negotiations failed, the 
United States Congress might feel obligated to take more hostile action.3 
Ambassador Wilson, acting on his <?Wll authority, invited the leaders of 
the revolt to the American embassy, where they arranged the compromises 
that ended the fighting. On February 18 General Huerta gave official 
notification of President Ma.dero's arrest, and Henry Wilson publicly 
stated his belief in the good intentions and ability of the new dicta-
4 tor. 
Washington remained silent during the events leading to Madero's 
fall. The usual statements concerning protection of American lives and 
, 
property were issued, but no stand was taken on the events that occurred . 
At least one major news~per reported that the Taft administration was 
relieved to hear of the coup and the appearance of a strong man who could 
handle the mercurial situation.5 In view of later statements made by 
Taft after leaving orfice, this was probably an accmrate description of 
2secretary of State Philander c. Knox to Secretary of the Navy G. 
von L. Meyer, February 10, 1913; in Papers Relating l2_ the Foreign k-
lations .2t, ~ United States, !211 (Washington, D. C.: Government Print-
ing Office, 1920), p. 700. Hereinafter cited as~ and the proper 
year. 
'.3American Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to Secretary of state Knox, 
February ll, 1913, in .mf!, ll.J., p. 704; Secretary of State Knox to 
American Ambassador Wilson, February 12, 1913, in _mm, 1:fil., p. 706. 
4American Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, February 18, 
1913, in J:!m, 1:fil,, P• 720. 
5 
~ ~ Times, February 19, 191'.3, p. 1. 
his feelingo 6 Rather than ma.king an inmediate decision concerning recog.,. 
nition, President Taft decided to stall by asking that specific assurances 
be receivedo These assurances involved the damage claims that had arisen 
during the Madero rebellion!) as well as others that had existed over a 
period of years between the United States and Merl.coo A settlement of 
this sort would require months of negotiation$ This was precisely what 
Taft wantedo The new President would be inaugurated in March, and Taft 
was not adverse to dumping the entire problem into someone else0 s ad-
ministrationo stalling enabled the judicious and slow-moving Taft to 
avoid quick, unpopular decisions and would present the newly elected 
Democratic president with an initial problemo Consequently9 Ambassador 
WU.son was told to await instructions and conduct blsiness in the in-
formal manner used in such situationso7 
The response of groups within Mexico to the arrest and ll'lllrder of 
Madero was immediate am hostileo led by Venustiano Carranza9 Maderista 
governor of Coahuila 11 a faction called the "Independent Consti'bltional= 
8 
ists" disavowed Huerta and asked other states to follow their lea.do 
This declaration was followed by a strongly worded letter to Taft 
criticizing his lack of opposition to the rea~tiona.ry forces that had 
captured the Mexican gove?'nmento It was also hcped 9 the conmru.nication 
continued, that Tatt0 s sucessor would "wo~k with more ciram11spection for 
6"They are not Sunday School ~uperintendents down there 9 and we can= 
not make the qualifications of Sunday School superintendents square with 
the necessities of the situation where anarchy prevailso" William. Howard 
Taft to Gus Karger~· July 22 9 1913si in Heney Fo Pringle 9 ~ ~ !!!.9, 
Times of William Howard Taft (2 volso: Hamden 11 Connoi Archon Books 51 1964)si 
II, Po~65o ----
?secretary of State Knox to American Amba.ssadcr Wilson~ Febl"U.ary 259 
19139 i n .f.B:'m, lfil9 Po 7380 
8Procl.amation of the Im~pendent Constitutionalists of the State of 
Coahu.ila, February l9s, 19139 in ~9 !2!111 Po 72.lo 
the social and political interests of Me:x:icoo"9 This act of open re= 
sistance to the new reginie was followed by the dispersal of federal 
·troops against the rebelso Most of northern Mexico was soon the scene 
at fighting .. 10 
As the signs of rebellion spread over .the states of Sonora, San 
/ 
Luis Potosi and Coa.huila, it became necessary for the Constitutionalists 
to promulgate a plan of revolutiono This is the first prerequisite to 
such movE111ents in Me:x:iooo On March 26, 1913, this formulation was com-
pleted when Carranza dictated the "Plan or Guadalupe" to his secretary, 
.Alfredo Brecedaoll In order to make room for all ~ntirnlhertistasll the 
plan was a series of broad general statements that allowed all discon-
tended people to find cause for joining the movemento The most far-
reaching provision stated that the rebel.lion was no mere provincial up-
heavalo I t s objective. was the complete military defeat of Huerta and 
control of Mexicoo This objective could be reached by &n all=Mexican 
armyp and help would not be sought or accepted from other nationso12 On 
March '.301) 19131) Carranza dew.~red . himself Pz>ovisic:mal President of 
Mexicoo With this the rebellion had the necessary comp0nents-=rationale, 
objectives and leaderol3 
9venustiano Carranza~ President William Ho Taft11 February 26 11 1913 51 
in Secretaria 'de Gobernaci6nll edo 9 .&! Labor Internacional !1! la Revolu= 
ci6n Constitucionalista ~ Mexico (Mexico: Imprenta de la Secreta:ria de 
Gobernacion, 1960)1) Po 190 · · 
10American Consul General Hanna at Monter::rey to Secretary of State 
Knox!) February 24 11 1913!) in _mm11 ~ Po 7360 
llRobert Eo Quirk!) lll!, Mex:toan Revolution 9 1914=.1ru,8 The, Convention 
of Aguascalientes (m.oomington 9 Indo: Indiana. University Press, 1960) 9 PPo 
~9o ' 
12Ameriean Vice Consul Bowman at Nogales to Secretary of State William 
Jo Bryanp March 28 11 1913 9 in .fBl!!9 l.2!111 Po 7830 
. I 
13American Consul msworth at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz to Secretary of 
State Bryan9 March 30 s, 1913 9 in ~1> mJ., Po 7840 
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The next step was to establish a Constitutionalist Agency in Washing-
ton as an avenue of communication with the government and people of the 
I 
United States. The agency thus created was headed by Rafael Zubaran 
Capnany and given unofficial aid by Luis Cabrera.14 This organization 
was the base and front for rebel activities throughout the country. The 
' 
man in charge of carrying out the agency's orders was Roberto Pesquiera, 
whose duties kept him constantly traveling between Mexico and the capital 
of the United States.15 In addition, there were other agents like Felix 
Sommerfeld who were to mingle with officials and reporters in Washington 
to present the Constitutionalist movement in its best light.16 Sommer-
feld had held a similar post under Madero and later carried out the same 
duties for Pancho Villa after the split in the rebel movement. To handle 
legal matters an expert on international law, Charles A. Douglas, was re-
tained to repre.sent the Carrancistas before the State Department. The 
retention of Douglas was particularly fortuna. te as he. was a close friend 
of Secretary of state William J. Bryan.17 Some agencies were also formed 
in :&l.ropean countries. For instance, the one in Paris was headed by 
Geraldo Murillo whose duty was to block all loans that Huerta might at-
tempt to obtain from Paris banking houses.18 
14u. s. Congress, Senate, Investigation of Mexican Affairs. Report 
and Hearing Before a Sub-Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Albert 
B. Fall, Presiding, Pursuant to Senate Resolution 106, 66th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 1920, II, 2412. Hereinafter cited as l!J:!. Hearings; ~ ~ 
Times, August 6, 1914, p. 18. 
15~ ~ Times, May 21, 191'.3, p. 6; Constitutional Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs Francisco Escudero to Secretary of State Bryan, November 
6, 1913, in~' !m,, P• 856. 
16~ ~ Times, August 10, 191'.3, P• 2. 
17Ibid., June 19, 1914, P• 2. 
18~ Hearings, II, 194'.3. 
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Changes were also occurring in the United States, albeit in a little 
more orderly manner. On March 4, 1913, Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated a~ 
the President, am with this cerell!ony ca.me changes in United States dip.. 
~ 
lomacy that were revolutionary in <themselves. President Wilson• s comment 
that "it would be an irony of fate if my admirrl,stration had to deal ehiefiy 
with ;foreign affairs" has been quoted so often that one wonders if' he 
really said it.19 If' he did, the chances are that he regretted it quick-
ly. The international problems that confronted him might have been 
ti.ring, irritating and frustrating; but it is doubtful if' he ever found 
any humor in them. 
The new President's view of' foreign affairs was that of' an extremely 
moral democrat. Ex:pediency would no longer be the watchword of the 
State Department. When it ca.me to recognizing men who ca.me to power by 
coups d'etat, it was to be understood that there was a right and wrong 
involved in such actions. 
,I:, 
Governments that came to power over the dead 
bodies of the officials that preceded them would no longer be recognized. 
This moral outlook was born from an over-confidence in the ballot box 
arxl democracy to a.meliorate bad conditions within nations. Woodrow 
Wilson was never to understand the Mexican revolution until he tempered 
moral democracy with realistic appraisal. 
On becoming chief executive, the new president had inherited the 
policies of his predecessor. The battleships called up during the coup 
were still in Mexican waters20 and were left in position despite the 
loud grumbling of lfuerta that it was a violation of Mexican sovereignty. 
19Arthur s. Link, Woodrow Wilson !!l9. the Progressive h, illQ.-
!211 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), P• file · 
20~ !2!:Js. Times, March ll, 1913, P• 1. 
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Not even the implication by Ambassador Wilson that discussion of such 
matters was impolitic at the time am that 2!_ ~ recognition could be 
wrecked by such protests, smoothed the pride of the dictator. 21 In ad-
dition to the ships, the embargo imposed on arms to Mexico, except for 
the central government, was still in effect. 22 The Constitutionalist 
Agency in Washington protested that this policy discriminated against 
them and asked arms either to be given or denied to both sides.23 Such 
requests were more in the line of show than in the hope of realizing ef-
fects. Besides, the Constitntionalists were getting a large number of 
arms by way of the age-old border tradition of smuggling that had been 
so prominent in the days of Madero.24 These surreptitious activities 
were aided indirectly by the Governor of Texas, who refused to co-
operate with federal authorities along the border.25 
These Taft-initiated measures were retained while Wilson pondered a 
solution to the Mexican crisis. He had already felt the pressure of 
interest groups in his first cabinet meeting. When he polled his ad-
visors at their first meeting President Wilson found mu.ch diversity of 
opinion. The only stable point held by the President himself was that 
Huerta could not retain power in Mexico, and before an.v plan was accept-
able it would have to include that provision. 
21American Embassy to Mexican Office of Foreign Affairs, March 22, 
1913, in PRFR, !2.JJ., PP• 785-786. 
22Segretary of State Bryan to American Consular Officers at Nogales, 
Ciudad Juarez, et al., April 2, 1913, in .m:!, !2.JJ., pp. 876-877. 
23confidential Agent M. Pe'rez Romero of the Constitutionalist Govern-
ment of Mexico to Secretary of State Bryan, June 26, 1913, in~. !2.JJ., 
pp. 880-881. 
24New ~ Times, March 31, 1913, P• 4. 
25Governor o. B. Colquitt of Texas to Secretary of State Bryan, April 
7, 1913, in .mm, 12U, p. 877. 
On May 611 1913 9 a ready-made proposal was presented to the Presi= 
dent by Julian Kru.ttschmidt9 chairman of the Southern Pacific Railroado 
'!his plan embodied the wishes of the business classes of the United 
States to stop the warfare in Maxi.coo It .called for fair elections to 
be held earlier than the announced date in Octobero Until such elections, 
lherta would remain~ interim president with the understa:rding that he 
would not be a candidateo If these guarantees were received, the United 
States would grant immediate recognition to the lherta regime in Mexico 
Cityo26 President Wilson was in basic agreement on most of these de"' 
mands, but ba1ked on giving recognition to lhertao On May 26 the plan 
was modified by dropping immediate recognition and merely volunteering 
the services of the United States to mediate points of dispite between 
the federal government in Mexico and the rebels, with the objective of 
holding electionso2'7 
With the modified proposa1s in hand, the President wavered momen= 
tarilyo· No matter how fine the pl.an9 it :ma.ttered not if conditions with= 
in Mexico We?'e unknowno Wilson did not know what these conditions wereo 
Such information was usually obtained from ambassadorial reportsS> but the 
President Os initial d:i.st:PJ.st cf Ambassador Wilson had tumed to disbelief o 
All dispatches from that source were disregardedo28 As Wilson hesitated 
more pressure was applied, this time from ~erloo itselfo In early May 
Huerta sent an ultimatum stating that unless his regime was recognized~ 
Ambassador vF..i.lson ° s official status wullld be revoked and the negotiations 
26Ray Stannard Ba.ker 9 W:>odrow WilsonS> Life and Letters (8 volso~ 
Garden City, New York: Page9 Doubleday and Doran.7!927=1939) 9 IVS> PPo 245"' 
2460 
27Arthur So Link 11 Wllsons lb! Struggle £2t Neutrality,, 1914:.1915 
(Prineeton9 NoJo ~ Princeton Uni.verisity Press 11 1960)!) Po 3520 
28Ba.ker9 Wilson, IVj PPo 238=2390 
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of claims ended. 29 Hard on the heels of this dispatch came another from 
the Constitutionalists declaring that if' they won, the principles of 
international arbitration would be used to settle all disputes.JO There 
was clearly a need for more info:rma.tion. 
In mid-April the President had decided that William B. Hale, a 
personal f'riend, was the man to send to Mexico as an observer. He wrote 
Hale asking him to tour central and. southern Mexico and report his im-
pressions. This was to be done as quietly as possible and with no of-
ficial instructions from the President.31 It should be noted that this 
original tour was not through the rebel stronghold in northern Mexico. 
This was a mistake that Wilson would suffer for in later monthso An-
other agent, Reginald del Valle, a f'riend of Secretary of State Bryan's, 
was sent a little later, but was recalled after ma.king statements that 
indicated the official nature of' his tour.32 
By July most of Hale's reports had been completed and studied in 
Washington. The Pl.-esident began to plan actively on a policy in line 
with the situation reported by Hale. The reports had been highly criti-
cal of Henry Lane Wilson, and it was felt the ambassador should be re ... 
moved as quietly and quickly as possible. He was recalled for a sup ... 
posed conference with the President in mid-July and the Embassy was left 
in the care of Cha.rg( Nelson O'Shaughnessy.33 The conference turned out 
29New J.2I.t, Times, May 9, 1913, P• 1. 
30ta.una Mo Smith, American Relations with Mexico (Oklahoma City: 
Harlow Publishing Coo, 1924), p·. 102. -
31Baker, Wilson, IV, P• 264; ~ X2£k. Times, May 29, 1913, Po 5. 
32Link, Struggle ~ Neutra1ity, p. 355. 
33 American Charg( Nelson 0' Shaughnessy to Secretary of State Br;yan, 
July 17, 1913, in .m:R, l2J:1, P• 812. 
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to be little more than the usua1 meeting of a president and his ambassa-
dor. Henry Lane Wilson was permanently removed :from his Mexican post due 
to his activities during the period in which Madero f'ell and to his re-
peated demands that Huerta be recogrqzed.34 
The second step of' Wilson's plan was the appointment or John Lind, 
. ' 
Progressive ex-Governor of' Minnesota, as confidential agent to the Huerta 
government for the purpose of' presenting a solution based on the modified 
Kruttschmidt plan. Lind's instructions lamented the lack of' progress 
being made by warring factions to stop the strife and called f'or the es-
tablishment of a government at Mexico City which the country would obey 
and respect. To aid in creating this government the United States was 
willing to of'f'er its services in the interests of' all Me:x:l.co as opposed 
to the interests of a special group or groups in Mexico or the United 
States. Before Mexico received these services the following conditions 






an immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico, 
a definite armistice solemnly entered into and scrupa, 
ulously observed; 
security given for an early and free election in 
which all will agree to take part; 
the consent of General Huerta to bind himself' not 
to be a candidate for election as President of' the 
Republic at the election; and 
the agreement or all parties to abide by the results 
of this election and cooperate in the most loyal way35 
in organizing and supporting the new administration. 
Rumors of' his mission and instructions arrived in Mexico before 
I 
The fear of a new wave of anti-Am.eriqan feeling prom.pted Charge 
O'Shaughnessy•s request for authorization to deny- that the instructions 
1· 
34secretary of' State Bryan to American Charge 01Shaughnessy, August 
4, 1913, in ~' m.J., PP• 817-818., 
. , 
35secretary of State Bryan to American Charge o• Shaughnessy, August 
27, 1913, in PRFR, ~' PP• 820-822; Baker, Wilson, ·rv, P• 267. 
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included th~ demand tw the resigna.tien of Hl'l.ertao This could mt be 
done; Secretary er state Bryan teld th.a Charg( to state that 14.nd came on 
a peace mission am that President Wilson telt it 'W".Ud help settle the 
' . . 
civil war.,:36 The Mexican government replied that peace mission or no 9 
it would mt aceept a ncn ... accradited representative 9 and it Lind did not 
carry official credentials ''his sojourn in the republic L'woo.iif not be 
pleas:ingo""J7 The credentials were there9 'w.t it is highly doubtful. that 
they made Lind11 s Mexican stay·arry more enjoyableo 
By August 169 1913, ·&erta0s Secreta.ry for Foreign Af'f'a.irs9 Federico 
Gamboa., bad s'bJ.died the f'11m.r ccnditicns.offered by Lind am ·was ready to 
reply. o.r the twenty""'seven Mexican sta.tes 9 he .explained, eighteen were 
controlled by the government in Mexico City o The remainder· would foll~w 
the Huerta regime if' the United States woald only plaoe more stringent 
ccnt:N>ls on s:am.ggling activities along the berdero The first propos~ of 
the settlement was then answered with the statement that the Ccnstitu ... 
tionallsts were bandits and!) as such9 could not be expected to obey am 
~stiee even if' it was pessible to :rwgotia.te oneo . As f'6ll" the ear~ and 
free ele@tionp it was hoped that this p€J>li<By Clould be @a.med O'llt9 but he 
could mt presume tc S'peak wit..'it ~ertitude a.bout future events., Whether 
' . ~ ·: . 
Hu.erta. wmm.ld be a. eandida.te was not a question that ~oold be,diS@USSed~ 
•< • , ! f L, 
t>nl.y the Mexican people e~w.d prcperly respond to truJ.t inquiey" $e(llre0 
tary Gamooa citosed by ~ta.ting that the wh@le is~e cf reeogrdtion was in 
itself a little ridiculemso After all, had not Lind been sent tc the 
' ' 
government in Mexi~o City9 and did this net imply that.it as ti)e legal . :·:~: . ,·: .-~·.::-+·, .'. 
. I . 
'.36Junerican Charge 0°Shaughnessy to Se@reta.ry ofi; State Bryansi Au.gust 
St 1913, Secretary @t state~ to Ameri~an Charge 0°Sha.ughnessy!> 
August 69 191'.3 9 in~' '~9 Po 818~ . 
. J'l Acting Minister for Fcr®ign Af'f a.irs of Maxie© Garza .Al.dape w 
Charge 0° Shaughnessy-11 A11gust 69 19139 in ~ 9 ~ po 819., 
one? Therefore, the entire situation could be easily solved it two 
things were done: the United States shoald aocept a fully aecredi ted 
Mexican .Ambassador and appoint a like individual. to Mexico.38 
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Nine days later, atter receiving only slightly modified instructions 
from Washington, Iii.nd attempted to reopen negotiations with the Huerta 
government. The old proposa1s were reintroduced and again :ridiculed and 
danolished · by Senor Gamboa, Then Lind ottered a veiled bribe by hinting 
that it the United States• proposals were accepted, Huerta would find 
American bankers more .agreeable. This implication irritated the Mexican 
·aeoretary' tor ·li'o:reign Affairs, who replied that the dignity of a nation 
cou1d not be bought •t an;r prive. Bu.t in the midst of this rancor the 
!herta offi~a1 did make one statement that cheered President WU.son. 
Constitutional pNvision prevented Ha.erta from being a candidate in the 
October election and, ftlrtherrrJ,ore, neither Ha.erta nor anyone else had 
said that he would be. 39 
With this exchange the Id.nd mission.orticiall.y ended. ats it a 
success or failure? The answer is 'both. The United States did obtain 
the information that Huerta apparently "NOU.ld not be a candidate, although 
even this was never specifically stated. Yet the old Mexican f'ear and 
dislike of Yankee intervention was aroused, and the people hardened in 
their support for the dictator. 
The northern rebels, le.ft out of the events involved in the first 
attempt by Wilson to bring peace to Mexico, did not relf!,ain silent during 
38Reply of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs Federico Gamboa to the 
Proposals er the .American Government, cenveyed through the Honorable 
John Id.nd, Au.gust 16, 1913, in m:R, !2!l, p. 824. 
'.39secreta.ry for Foreign Affairs Gamboa to John Lind, August 26, 1913, 
in .fm!l, ~' PP• 8'.32-835. 
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the negotiationso As the points ot settlement involved a certain a.mount 
of cooperation in the form of an armistice between the opposing factions, 
the revolutio:naries were angry over not being included. On August 20, 
I 1913, Jose Maytorena, rebel governor of Sonora and a Carrancista spokes-
man, gave the Constitutionalist view of the necessities required to end 
the internal stmte. It was impossible., wrote Maytorena, to expect to . '• . 
reach an agreement with Huerta alone that would stop the fighting. The 
only solution was the complete military defeat of the central government 
by the "good Mexican people." For this to be accomplished, he added;, it 
was only necessary for the United States to lift the embargo on arms to 
rebel-held areas. Once this was done, the rebels would drive out the 
dictator with considerable ease and rapidity.4o This was not news to 
\il.shington circles.· The Constitutional.1st Agency had emphasized, from 
the day of its creation, that Carranza would not compromise on his ideas 
of complete military victory and absolute refusal to confer with Huerta. 
Madero had tried conciliation and compromi*1e, and his fate taught the 
. rebels the inefficiency of such a policy.41 Further requests that the 
embargo on arms be dropped were made by Dr. H. A. Tllpper and Captain J. 
T. Armstrong of the International Peace Forum.. These two had talked with 
' ' Carranza in Mexico and had been asked to travel to Washington tor the 
express purpose of asking the President to allow the Constitutionalists 
to obtain arms openly from the United States. In return the First Chief 
promised to negotiate all damage claims with foreigners, guarantee free 
and fair elections and harmonize United States-Mexican relations.42 No 
40Governor Jos/ Maytorena of Sonora to Secretary of State Bryan, 
August 20, 1913, in !!fl!, l.21.l, P•. 820. 
41New York Times, May 21, 1913, P• 6. 
42 Ibid., August 27, 1913, P• 2 .. 
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known reply was :madeo 
Having received Huerta's rather nebulous promise not to be a candi ... 
date in the elections, President Wllson decided to adopt a ''watch and 
wait" attitude. He went before Congress on August 27, 1913; to explain 
his policy and report on the Id.nd mission. In this address the President 
asked the rhetorical question: what should be done? Before anyone could 
respond, he answered his inquiry. "We can attord to exercise the self. 
restraint of a re$lly great nation which realizes its own. strength and 
scorns to misuse it." The United States would, therefore, withdraw com-
pletely from any sort of intervention in Mexico and leave the factions to 
their war. To insure that this could be done, all Americans were re-
quested to leave Mexico to avoid aeyunnecessary risk.43 Furthermore, 
the embargo was extended to include :military supplies to all areas. Ir, 
in.the. fl,J.ture, a central administration was established that followed 
the lines or Wilson's proposals, the United states would recognize it.44 
Until that day, Mexico's problems were her own. 
·Following this pronouncement conditions in Mexico appeared to be 
stabilizing. The pressure on President Wilson diminished as both parties 
soft-pedaled the issue lest it cause a shift or the equilibrium, an atti ... 
tude that was in direct contrast to the events preceding the Presidential 
address. In mid-August Senator He:,ke Smith.of Georgia had stirred Washing .. 
ton 'With the accusation that a powerf'ul rebel lobby was operating in 
Washington and had been influential in obtaining the recall or Ambassador 
4'.3 u. s. Congress, Mexican .Affairs, Address Delivered g .joW 
session S?t the .:em. houses at Co~ess, August .22, .J31J,, House Document 
205, 63rd Cong., 1st sess., p. ~ 
44 J!!!: l5?r!. 'am.es, August 28, 1913, P• lo 
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Henry Lane Wllson.4.5 The charge was answered by the Constitutionalist 
Agency in Washington, which replied that it was completely f'alse. Ac-
cording to the Agency, only one Senator had been engaged in conversation 
by the Constitutionalists, and this had been casual. Fa.rthermore, no 
contact at all had b_een made with the State Department.. Af'ter this minor 
outburst, Congress settled back and waited to see what the ta.tu.re wou.ld 
bring to Mex:1.co. 46 
This period of' relative calm was not to last. When the Catholic 
I . 
Party nominated Federico Gamboa and Ugenio Rascon for President and Vice 
President on September 24, the United states was optimistic .. Both of 
these men were acceptable to Washington, and the Mexican government was 
informed that if' these two or men of' equal merit were elected, recog-
nition would be rapid, even it the Constitutionalists did not r~cognize 
them. :ait while Gamboa was campaigning in the Parque de San Angel in 
Mexico City, a shadow was already f'aJJ.ing over the capital. The northern 
rebels had got their offensive underway .. In late September, the .Consti-
tutionalist leaders assembled to plan an attack on the Hu.ertista strong-
hold ot the north, Torrain. Pancho Villa, former small-time bandit and 
' ' 
Maderista, was given command of the operation and the 10,000 man army to 
effect it.47 
The importance or this attack e~ be. seen by a glance at a •P or 
Mexico. 
I 
If Torreon fell, Mexico City, not an easy city to defend, was 
open to the Constitutionalist onslaught. President '\'i!Uson•s first agent 
45Thid., August 19, 1913, P• 2. 
' ' 
46Ibid. 
47 Altonso Taraoena, La. Verdadera Revoluci/n · (17· vols. J Mexico: F.di-
torial Jus, S. A., 1965),~, PP• 95-96. 
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to Mexico, William f. Hale, recognized th.is fact. and nshed to Washington 
to confer with the President. He told Wilson that the ca.rrancistas could 
no longer be ignored an:l urged the President to work behind the scenes to 
bring Huerta~ the First Chief to the conference table.48 This infor-
mation was surprising to .Wilson as, for the first time, he became a;ware 
that the factions were of ap~xima.tely equal strength and that a so .. 
lution would have to include both. Feeble efforts were made to thaw the 
coldness between atsldngton and the Constitutionalists by isuggesting that 
if Carranza took part in the Oc~ber elections, the United states would 
be appreciative. The rebel reply was short, :t"irm and pointed. They 
wuld not participate in the elections, and they reiterated their :t"o:rmer 
statements on the need for absolute victory.49 
The confidence, so evident in the Constitutiona1ist reply, was justi-
fied. On October 18 Torreln fell, and repercussions swept the country. 
The conservative groups in Mexico Cicy began to picture the rate that 
awaited if' the Constitatio~ists occupied the Capital. Panic and tear 
were everywhere. Charg( o• Shaughnessy requested · more battleships be sent 
to Mexican waters in the hope that a display or force would aid in abat-
ing the tear and bring the people "to a sense ot pollUcal responsi-
bility.n.50 The use ot ships had not worked during the chaotic days of 
Madero's fall and did not work now. All definitions or political re-
spensibility were violated on October 12 when Haerta dissolved an in-
creasingly rebellioa.s Chamber or Deputies and arrested more than one 
48L1nk:, S!,rgggle for Neutral.ity, PP• 364-365. 
49Ibid., P• 365. 
50Amerioa.n Charg( O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State Bryan, Octo-
ber 8, 1913, in PRFR, 19lj~ PP• 835-836. 
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hundred of its members.51 
The parliamentarian who served as President or the United States 
could only view this action as rep1:1gna.nt and unjustifiable. Hu.erta was 
warned that if harm came to any of the legislators the United States and 
the rest of the civilized world would begin to have doubts concerning 
Mexican cha.raater.52 Additionally, the dissolution and arrest caused 
other doubts to rise. How wou;td the government finance itself as it 
could no longer legally impose taxes? Would it seize American property 
to get money? If Hu.erta did so, would he have any compunctions about 1m .. 
posing himself as a candidate in the elections? 
Two of these questions were quickly answered. For finances, the 
Mexican government would use the tariff as the principal source of reve-
nue. Therefore, the tariff was raised 50~ above its tor.mer levei.53 
Only time could answer the third question; but Wilson feared the response. 
He had committed himself to recognizing the winner of the elections. Yet 
if Hu.erta controlled them he could; get: a man of his choice elected and 
rule behind the scenes. To avoid this possibility the United States 
started to hedge on the commitments of recognition. Wilson made it clear 
that doubt existed that the elections would be conducted in a valid 
manner, and the United States would be cautious in accepting the results/4 
51.American Chargl O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State Bryan, October 
12, 1913, in ,!:!l!, ~ p. 836. 
52secretary of State Bryan to American Charg( O'Shaughnessy, October 
12, 1913, in .ml!, J:2.!l, pp. 837-838. 
53secretary of State Bryan to American Chargt O'Shaughnessy, October 
20, 1913, in f!m, 12!1, P• 8~ • 
.54secretary of State Bryan to American Charg' O'Shaughnessy, October 
13, 1913, in _mm, 191'.3, p. 838; F.dith O'Shaughnessy, Jliplomat•s Wife in 
Mexico (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1916), po 14. 
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Wilson• s expectations were not to be denied. The October elections 
55 were fraudulent; Huerta.not only ran, but won. The American President 
was furious and made no attempt to conceal it. On November 1, 1913, he 
instructed Nelson O'Shaughnessy to deliver an ultimatum to lm.erta that 
mirrored his feeling. The ultimatum stated that retention of power by 
lm.erta was a complete denial of his previous claims; that a Provisional 
Government, headed by a neutra+ or a group of neutrals, be to:rmed im-
mediately; and that any attempt on the part of' Hu.erta to substitute a 
pa.ppet would cause extreme complications in Mexico-United states rela-
tions. If' not, the u. s. might be forced to back another group, in 
partioular the Constitutionalists.56 
In light 0£ past events, President Wilson had no illusic,ns as to 
what Hu.erta•s reply would be. CC!>nsequently, in mid-November, he sent 
WLlliam B. Hale to the border, near Hermosillo, where the Carrancistas 
were holding conferences. In return the Constitutionalists dispatched 
their agent-at-large, Roberto Pesquiera, to Wlshington. He was not given· 
entrance to the State Department but was promised that all his reports 
W'Olll.d be read.57 
While W!shington read reports, Hale delivered a telegram trom Secre-
tary of state Bryan to the assembled rebels at the Hotel Eseobosa in 
Hermosillo. The :message contained in the telegram promised a lifting of 
55oeneral Viotoriano Pherta to General Joaqu{n Mass, Military Govern-
or of Paebla, October 22, 1913, in m!,· 1913, PP• 853-854; WU1 G. Davis, 
Experiences eg, Observations ,!t, A Consular Officer Jhri5' lh!, Recent !!e,.-
can Revolution (Chula Vist~, caJ.if.: Wayside Press, 1920 , PP• 8-9. ., 
56zdn1c, Strllggle for Neutrality, PP• 380-381. 
57New York Times, Nov~ber 4, 1913., P• 2; The CQnstitu.tionalist 
SecretaeyforForeign Atf'airs Escudero to Secretary- of' state Btoyan, No-
vember 6, 1913, in PRPR, m.J., P• 856. 
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or the embargo for the rebels if three conditions were meto First, Car .. 
ranza must sign a Washington-prepared declaration stating that the lifting 
of the embargo was no personal favor to Carranza bat to all or Mexico. 
SecontD.y, :b.e mst proclaim publicly that he protected lives and property 
in the areas he contl"olled; when it appeared he had not, it was clue to a 
breakdown in communication. Thir<D.y, the rebel leader had to state that 
United States• interests in Mexico were superior. to those of my E.uro-
pean country • .58 
The choice was simple.· It Carranza turned leadership or the re-
bellion over to President WU.son, he could get arms. It was an obvious 
and crude attempt to bribery, and Ca.rranza•s response clearly indicated 
his feelings toward the machinations of Washington. Constitutionalist 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Francisco Escudero, chided the United 
States for not giving .full oredentialf!S to.Hale as it had for Iil.nd in his 
mission. Unless mch c:i;-edentials were given to Hale, and the conditions 
put in writing, they wow.d not even be discussed. But if all this was 
done, Carranza still would not relinquish leadership of the movement tor 
gans.?9 
Carranza•s rei'tlsal turn~ Wilson to declarations and dispatches that 
were more emotional and emphatic than arq previously made. by him. The 
President stated that revolution and murder mst end in La.tin America. 
Mexico was going to be the starting point or the, crea¥,on of a new atti-
tude toward democracy in. the southern hemisphere. And all this, even it 
58 I. I Isidrio Fabela, Historia Diplomat:ica de la Revolueion Mexicans. 




it required force rather than.persuasion and a call to moral prl.nGipleo 60 
With ea.cll decilara.tion (i;l)f this nature by Wilson 11 the conservative classes 
or Mexico stiffened in their support, f'or lfu.erta.o '!'hey were now aware 
that he was their last chance to retain the Mexico that had been so 
profitable to themo This boil.stared the sagging eentru government in 
Me:xico 9 and by 1914 the Constitutionalists were ha.ltedo Yet Wilson ha.d 
said force if neeessa.:ey1> and once stated such threats tend to become al"' 
terna:tive avenues that a.re hard to avoido 
The American President had one last reserve before he gave way to 
' 
the use of foreeo This was to lif·t the embargo on arms to the rebels to 
see if the Constitutionalists e©Uld deliver on their prom:iseso After a 
ha.sty exchange of letters 9 Luis Cabrera, Constitutionalist representative 
in Washington, assured President Wilson that the rebels would take all 
possible precautitOlns tl!ll pr,:,·t.s©t lives and p?'<lllpe:t"ty in their area.so 61 The 
usual feelers as to how su~h a policy lffi)uld be aceepted by Congress were 
lutiona.ries started recieiving ~ns. on Feb:t'llt:'..I"Y '.3 11 19140 Mexi~o wuld 
undergo a "housecileaning o o o by h@me talento"62 
Again,i the ~esr.:i.l ts were not th~se expe~tedo. Rather than weakening 
lfu.erta,1 the embargo a~tually aided him9 as the mom.red eila.sses fi(»'Gv' raised 
loans to help their leader w.ithstand Ameriean preswreo63 In this 
60seereta:cy of State Bryan ro Ameri.csan Charg. ( oo Shs:ughne13sy ~ :tjo= 
vember 24, 1913 in PRFRj 191'.h ppo 443=4l-14; Edu~©> Luquin,) ~ J:Qli tiela 
Inte:rn.aei01:i:1al de la Revoluciin Consti 'bJ:tionalist:a. (Merlil.lloi g Talleres Gl>"l= 
· ficios de La Na;r'&:n9 i957) 9 pp°7 29=30~ 0°Shaughneissyl> ~.J¥Om&t0 s Wi.f'e 9 po 
660 --
61Howard F o Cline~ ~ Unit~ .§.'t.at,e_! ~ M¢~,2. (Forge Villey·;, Masso 8 
Atheneum~ 1963)~ Po 1540 
62ciarence Clendenen~ 'll,+e Unit~ States ~ fansli~ Villa (Ithai;))a: 
Cornell University Press!,) 1901), Po 1950 
63Li.nk, ~ruggle ~,t, NeUt,,..al.itz11 Po 1950 
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period, the Constitutionalists were successful in retaking Torreon, which 
they had lost earlier, and the route to Mexico City was open again to 
them. However, a division emerged between Villa and Carranza to cripple 
the advance. 64 It was soon evident that Wilson must deliver on his 
threats ot force or admit that he was blutting; bllt he1needed justifica-
tion for such action. He did not have long to wait. 
On April 9 the .American sailors were arrested at Tampico, and what 
seemed a minor accident expanded to a matter ot international importance. 
It served as the cause tor initiating a plan that had been urged on Wil-
son in January by John Lind. Lind had advised Wilson to use force even 
to the extent of seizing Mexican ports along the coast. 65 On April 2.1 
.American forces seized Veracruz and placed all other Mexican Gulf ports 
under blockade.66 It was not long before the .American President realized 
his blunder. Ha.erta, as expected, broke all diplomatic relations with 
the United States. Bllt, less expectedly-, Carranza spoke of being on the 
verge or war due to American troops on Mexican sou.67 The Constitu-
tionalists had littJ.e choice in making such a declaration. To have done 
otherwise would have marked the rebel movement as a Yankee-dominated one, 
and this would have meant its death in the eyes of Mexican popular opin-
ion. The President's unawareness of this basic Mexican trait is incom ... 
prehensible. But the fact remains that he did not understand that his 
64Robert E. Quirk, Au Affair gt Honor: W:>odrow Wilson.!!£ the Oc-
c:Z:tion .2t. Venacruz (Lexington: University- of Kentucky- Press, 1962), PP• 
5-. 
65!!:! ~ Times, January 3, 1914, P• 2; Baker, Wi.lson, IV, P• 299. 
66ank, struggle tor Neutrality, P• lK>l. 
67 Venustiano Carranza to George c. Carrothers, April 22, 1914, in 
ld!. Labor Internacional, PP• 78-80. 
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leadership could be only as ef'fective as it was urmoticedo The resw.t 
was the .Ameriea.n o~cupation of a. fo?>eign port W,1.th enemies on all sideso 
The offer cf Argentina.9 Brazil and Chile to settle the conflict was 
quickly accepted by the United States 51 which was more than willing for 
negotia.tieno Before the conference ecmld begin the ABC countries in"" 
sisted that the embargo be reinstated and that hostile groups within 
The first or these conditions could Mexico deelare a. general. a.rmisticeo 
be met by the United States aloneo The second qepended on Venustiarw ., 
Carranza. 51 and the rebel leader showed his ever=present obdu.raneyo The 
First Chief was agreeable to having the withdrawal of troops discussed; 
but this had nothing t('l) do with the internal affairs of Mexico or the 
. . 68 
civil war there, and he declared he would accept no armisticeo To prove 
that this denial was a. matter of principle rather than pettiness Carranza 
i.nstru.cted Rafael Zubu,'1 in Washington to W!"i te the President that the 
rebels.had complete fa.1th in the justice and high moral ohara.cter o:f the 
people and leaders of the United Stateso69 Still the Constitntio:nalists . . 
woold send no delegates to the conference that opened ~n May 185> 19149 
and ref'used to re,eil(l)gn:ize the legitimacy f))f the mediatc»rso .After som.e 
pressureii> Carran~a did relent and ~nst:ruct the leaders of the Constitu~' 
tio:niorw.ist Agenc:iy in Washington to attend the meetingso By t,hat time 
the ABC countries :toefused t10 admit them to the bargaining tables except 
as unofficial ~bse:Mrerso?O 
68ve:mistiano Carranza. to .ABC Media:tors9 May ls, 19149 in ibido 9 Po 9lo 
69R., Zuba.r~ Capma.ey, Representative cf Curam:a. to Secretary of 
State Bryan and President Wllson9 May 149 19149 in PRFRj 1914;, PPo 496 ... 4970 ...,,._,., . 
70Special Commissioners to Se@retaey of State Br,ya.nii> May 22 51 19149 
in lJFB.9 ~si 504; Link9 Struggle !£r, !_eutralit;t:si Po 4010 (The UoSo 
Commissioners w the ABC Conference were Joseph Ro Lsmar 9 F!"ederiieik Wo 
Lehmann and Ho Pereeval Dodgeo) 
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Wilson considered the First Chief''s.l'efu.sal to be signs. of narrow-
ness and dullness and began to seek other means of' controlling the revo-
lution. He still believed in Carranza•s honesty and high moral princi-
ple, but what was needed was a man who showed more inclination to co-
operate. In June Wilson wrote w. H. Page, Ambassador to England, that 
the people of Mexico needed a better umerstanding of Pancho Villa,71 who 
would be whatever the United States wanted him to be. If the Constitu-
tionalist split widened, the United States stood to gain f'rom arJY' contin-
geno;y that ai-o se. 
In late July the ABC mediators adjourned. Their recommendations 
spoke of' a Provisional Government agreed on by all parties and then 
recogm.zed by the United States. Bnerta was never called by :name, his 
removal being only implied. Even with this neutral and nebulous ending, 
the conference had served W:>odrow Wilson• s purpose. He had wanted to 
rid Mexico ot Iherta, ~d he succeeded. While the conference talked, the 
United States continued to hold Veracruz and enforce the embargo. This 
course forced the dictator to obtain arms from Europe, which was more ex,. 
pensive. At the same time, the American occupation of' Veracnz robbed 
lm.erta ot his main SOlU"Ce ot revenu•• The longer the conterence talked, 
the more Bnerta lost. 
Bnerta • s losses were the c,onsti tu.tionalists • gain. The rebels had 
lost no money.by the c~ptnre of Veracruz, and they were still.obtaining 
arms tram the United States. Three or four days attar the embargo had 
been reimposed, the steam.er Antilla puffed out ot the port of New York. 
'!he steam.er carried guns and ammnnition bound for the Constitutionalist-
71Woodrow Wilson to Walter H. Page, June 4, • 1914, in Baker, Wilson, 
IV, P• '.347. 
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held port or Tampico. Ha.erta, threatened to blockade the port to prevent 
delivery. '!he Unit~d States, stating it was an international port and 
could not be blockaded, sent ships to entorce the declaration.72 ~s 
violation ot the embargo was a little too blatant; John Lind informed the 
Constitutionalists in the United States that no more such open violations 
would be allowed. He advised them to take out papers tor Havana and then 
sail to Tampico instead. On Jttne 16, 1914, a million cartridges were 
·shipped on the Sunshine with papers tor Havana. !he to "stress or 
weather" the Sunshine was blown to TQJUPico; other like shipments tol-
lowed.73 There was a small tine charged tor taking out false papers, but 
this fine was later remitted by the Secretary or the Treasury. 74 
An armed and moving Constitutionalist offensive, plus financial ex-
haustion, caught up with lherta on July 16, 1914. The dictator resigned, 
leaving the only act to signify a :run victory the occupation·or.Mexioo 
01 ty by the rebels. President Wilson, temembering the.· past atti tu.de 
of Carranza, decided not ·to wait before making his demands. On July 23 
Carranza was presented with conditions on which hinged United States 
2•ecogni tion. 75 This requirement was followed eight days later by a mes-
sage to Carranza stating the reluctance or the United States to contem-
plate the "possible consequences to Mexico it the Lu. s;J should be 
forced.to withhold recognition fr9ll1 those whe are to succeed Huerta."76 
72Fall Hearings, I, p. 792; Manuel Calero, The Mex:1.can Polic:y S: 
Vbodrow Wil.soa {New York: Smith and Thompson, l9ffi, P• 27. 
7'.3Fall Hearings, I, P• 793. 
74Ibid., II, p. 2411. 
76Secretary of State Bryan to Vice Consul Silliman, July 31, 1914, 
in .fRER, 12].4, P•. 577 • . . , . 
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The Constitutionalist leader made nc reply9 hlt when he entered Mexico 
City on .August 20 he made several remarks of appreciation for \illodrow 
WU.sc,n°s foreign pclicyo ?7 
There was m Constitutionalist celebration on the .August day when 
C&rranza entered the capital. of Mexicoo There was no longer a Ccnstitu= 
tio:na.list JIWV'emento Now the rebels were either Carra:nc:1.stas or Villis= 
taso This division was net one precipitated by a disagreement in revo ... 
lutionary dogma, tor neither faction had speoifi.o stated policies of' re= 
formo Rather it shoul.d be viewed as a struggle between caudill.2!,, with 
the man, mt the principle, the only faetor of impcrtantJe., 
As early as June 12, 19141> Car.r;oanza and Pancho Villa violently dis,., 
agreed over military strategy, which led to Villa0 s resignation, quickly 
. . ' 
foUowed by his r.e,z,enlistment after an appeal made by others of the rebel 
78 . 
movemento Hoping to aveid the consequences. of su~h a divisi~n9 the 
President or the Um.tad States sent George Co Carr@thers to Mexia<> in 
June with the purpos~ (l)f patching this break in the ?'eV(i)lutiorJJary wallo 
By June 18 Ca.rrothe?;s infomed the Seci:reta.ry of state that a rappN@}p 
ment was impossible al though Villa premised ~ follow the wlll of' the 
other generals even it it meant fellowi:ng Carranzao79 The Villista agent 
in Washingw,ns, Felix Semme:d'eld9 followed with the de~laration that Villa 
did mt dispute Carra.nza.0 s leadership and was not contemplating hostile 
80 I 
action against himo Just as this statement was beginning to soothe 
77viCile Consul Silliman to·Secretaey of stiate Bf,yan, August 20s, l914s, 
in .m!,!i ~ Po .5880 · · 
78consul F.dwa.rds to SeClretary ot State Brya.n9 J'W'Le 125) 19149 in 
Em!i 1914s, PPo .541=5420 
79speeial. Agent Carrethers to Se@retary (»f' State Bey-an9 June 18 9 
19149 in .f!m, ~ po 5420 
80~ ~ Times, July l, 1914si Po 2o 
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worried officials, the Constitutionalist division widened. This time it 
appeared in the courts of the United States. The Villistas operating in 
the United States had attempted to make off with 4,000,000 pesos of Con-
stitutionalist'currency. Villa was sent a strong protest by Roberto 
Pesquiera. The protest had little effect, and a court injunction was ob-
tained to prevent the Villa rebels from leaving the country- with the 
money.81 This was hardly the attitude of factions that had composed their 
differences. 
In an attempt to work out an operable unity, Villa and Carranza con-
ferred on July 8. Both men agreed there should be a convention held, 
after Huerta had been removed, for the express purpose of setting elec-
tion dates and arranging the new government. Delegates to the meeting 
would be appointed on the ~sis of one per 1,000 men; this ratio would 
favor Villa's Army of the North.82 This agreement was effective, but 
the rebel movement was still far from united. On July 18 Villa wrote his 
friend, General Hugh Scott of the United States Army, that he was still 
having difficulties with the First Chief and was not getting his share 
of st1pplies and coal for his troop trains.83 To correct this situation, 
Villa ordered Felix Sommerfeld to increase his purchasing activities in 
the United States·. With the aid of the Flint Company of New York, Villa 
soon had all the needed arms and ammunition.84 A stockpile of supplies 
was also assembled in ~pparent preparation for the full break with 
· 'I I " 
81Ibid., July 6, 1914, P• J. 
82Special Agent Carrothers to Secretary of state Bryan, July 14, 
1914, in .mr!i, 1914, PP• 559-560. 
8Jc1endenen, lb.!. United States !ru! Villa, pp. 100 ... 101. 
84Link, Stroggle ,l2!: Neutralitz, P~.235. 
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Carranza that Villa had already visualized. 
The split in the north had its counterpart in a division between the 
southern rebels led by Emiliano Zapata and the northern Carrancistas. It 
was an historical accident that Zapata and Carranza were fighting Huerta~ 
There had been no communication between the groups in the years between 
Madero' s d.eath and the resignation of Huerta. This coldness was en-
hanced by the fact that Carranza allowed federal troops to hold the 
capital until he arrived rather than letting the closer Zapatistas occupy 
it.85 
After Carranza took Mexico City, Washington urged him to reach some 
sort of conciliation with Zapata.86 Before Carranza's arrangements could 
be made, Villa and Zapata had already met and reached an understanding. 
The only way that Zapata would unite with Carranza was for the First Chief 
to sign the "Plan of Ayala" which called for immediate land distribution 
and Zapata for President. Since Carranza would not meet these conditions, 
he was told that Zapata would not agree to anything that Villa had not 
previously endorsed.87 
In the first days of October the dissenting revolutionary factions 
convened as provided for in the Villa-Carranza agreement of July. The 
meetings were held in the quiet Mexican village of Aguascalientes. There 
the rebels debated and argued throughout the remainder of the month. By 
the first of November the decision had been made to turn from Carranza, 
85 
Quirk, Aguascalientes Convention, p. 56. 
86Secretary of State Bryan to Vice Consul Silliman, August 25, 1914, 
in .M!, 1914, P• 591. 
87 Special Agent Canova to Secretary of State Bryan, September 1, 
1914, in ~' 1914, PP• 592-593. 
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and Eulalio Guti,rrez was elected Provisional President or Mexico11 88 
Carranza. re:fused to recognize the. authority of these proceedings and was 
promptly given an ultimatum to turn over the executive power by November 
10 at 6 p.m.89 He ref\lsed the ultimatum, ordered his delegates f'rom 
Aguascalientes, and told all loyal generals to take command of their 
armies.90 
With the above action the revolution was changed to a civil war. On 
one side was Villa in command of the forces of the convention at Aguas-
calientes and supported by Zapata in the south. Opposite him was Venus-
/ 
tiano Carranza with his excellent tactician, General Alvaro Obregon, who 
bore the major responsibility of military planning. The rell18ining force 
was Woodrow Wilson. What policy would he foUow in dealing with the two 
factions, both claiming to be working for the general good of Mexico? 
The fall and winter of 1914 must have been.a dark period after the re-
laxation of tension th,t had followed the taking of Mexico City by the 
Constitutionalists. The Mexican problem was .still unsolved. 
The United States government was well informed about the constantly 
widening gulf that appeared in the rebel ranks. There were several 
agents of the United States operating in Mexico as representatives to 
the various military groups. 'l'hey could also see the signs of the di-
vision that occurred among the Constitutionalists at work in the United 
States. In August, Carranza had established the Mexican Bllreau of Infor-
mation in New York which claimed that Villa was the tool of reactionaries 
88Special Agent CanQVa to Secretary of State Bryan, November· .2~ ~914, 
in .!!!!ll, 1914, P• 617. ' 
89special Agent Canova to Secretary of State Bryan, November 5, 1914, . 
in PRFR. 1914, P• 618. · 
90vice Consul Silliman to Secretary of .. state Bryan, November 8, 1914, 
in ml\, 1914, P• . 618. 
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in Mexico and that Carranza was the true representative or the revol'u-
tion.91 FOllowing these activities was the creation or a VUlistf .Agency 
in Washington to ~blicize the revolutionary qualities or Pancho Villa.92 
Fllrther to complicate the situation, the convention at .Aguascalientes 
also employed its own representatives in the United States, under the 
general direction or Jos' Vasconcelos.93 
Before the split was complete President Wilson and Secretary or 
State Bryan had decided they would support .Pancho Villa.94 This policy, 
so incomprehensible in retrospect, seemed proper at the time. Carranza 
~d not accept Washington's advice or leadership, while Villa was only 
too willing to work hand-in-hand with Wilson and Bryan.95 By guiding 
I 
,:·.,··'.'.· _::,,"i:. . : . 
Villa, Wllson:-nl:t i~/possible to direct the revolution toward his goals 
without making the/t,dstake he had made at Veracruz. There were also 
reasons or expediency for supporting Villa. SU~h a policy would be 
popular in the United States, where the military exploits or Villa had 
been given colorful. coverage by the press. It was- also believed that 
Villa had the resources to win in a showdown. He commanded a 40,ooo man 
army with ample supplies for an extended.conf'l.ict.96 
There was one remaining entanglement from which Wilson had to 
91William M. Rossiter, "?iexican-American Relations, 1913-1920. A 
Reapt,raisal" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation', University or Chicago, 
1953), P• 162; Clendenen, l'h!, United States !!!9, Villa, P• 195. 
92.!!! !2.tk Times, October 21, 1915, P• 1. 
93J. Fred Rippy, Jost Vasconcelos and Guy Stevens, American Policies 
Abroad: Mexico (Chicago: University or Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 121-
122. . . 
94un1c, Struggle !2£ Neutralit:y, p.· 238. 
95Ibid., P• 235. 
96e:tendenen, !!!!, United States !.m! Villa, pp. 131-132 • 
.. ·:;,.:· 
76 
extricate himself before withdrawing and working through Villa. Veracruz 
would have to be evacuatedo On September 15 the President ordered Secre-
tary or State Bryan to start preparations for withdrawing .American troops 
from the port cityo As Carranza controlled the general area around the 
port, Washington asked him to name the official who would take over the 
customs house.97 However, iini:llediate plans for evacuation were halted by 
rumors that Carranza would demand additional payments other than those 
collected by the United States on goods imported and exported during the 
occupation and that the people who had worked for the United States would 
be punishedo98 Bryan sought a denial or these rumors by a direct state-
• 1 .., 
ment from the Mexican Secretary for Foreign .Affairs, Isidrio Fabela, but 
the Carrancistas remained silent.99 
While Carranza made no promises, the Provisional President Eulalio 
Gu.ti,rrez did. He stated that he would fulfill the conditions for evac-
uation. I Villa added that he would support Gutierrez's promise with his 
sword.100 Carranza was therefore pressured into responding. The remov-
al or .American troops was particularly important as Carranza needed a 
site for his headquarters that would be easier to defend than Mexico.City~ 
On November 9 he issued a general amnesty to all Mexicans who had worked 
for the United States and promised no additional taxes or import duties.101 
97secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison to Secretary of State Bryan, 
SeJ:>tember 15, 1914, in .ffi[R, 1914, P• 598. 
98Acting Secretary of State Robert Lansing to Brazilian Minister to 
Mexico Cardoso de Oliverira, September 22, 1914, in ~' 1914, p. 603. 
99Secretary of State Bryan to Brazilian Minister to Mexico Cardoso 
de Oliviera, October 7, 1914, in 1Sm, 1914, P• 6170 
lOOspecial Agent Carrothers to Secretary of State Bryan, November 3, 
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'!he United States was now ready to leave, but before doing so 1 t 
wanted an understanding that the pert was not being left to a particular 
faction. On November 13, 1914, the state Department wrote Villa, Ga.ti(r. 
rez, and Carranza identical letters informing them that American troops 
would be withdrawn on November 23.102 One week later, General Frederick 
Ftlnston, commander of the occupation troops, was ordered from the city 
"in the best practical fashion ••• and ffe maki[ no declaration that 
would be interpreted as committing this government to the recognition of' 
the authority of any individual or faction.nl03 Three days later Consul 
Wllliam Canada at Veracl'l1.z reported that .-erican troops had left with-
out incident.104 On November 26 C•rranza was already setting up the seat 
ot his govel"ll.Jllent in the pert.105 The following day Emiliano Zapata 
. .·' 
entered Mexico City.106 
Wl th the t.1.ight of' carranza to Veracrt1z, the United States broke of'f 
all unofficial and official commnication with him. Even the omnipresent 
Wilson agent was no longer in attendance. The next logical step would 
have been tor Wilson to recognize the pro-Villa Co111Vention government; 
but the American President had acquired a certain degree of caution and 
hesitated to commit himself. On December 2 Secretary of' State Bryan 
l02Secretary of' State Bryan to Brazilian Minister to Mexico Cardoso 
de Oliveira, November 13, 1914, in PRFR, 19!4,·pp. 62;1.-622. 
l03Acting Secretary of War John Breckinridge to Genera1 Frederick 
Funston, November 20, 1914, in ..f!!!, ~, P• 625. · 
104consul William C~da to Secretary of State Bryan, November 23, 
1914, in !!!!, ~' P• 626. 
l05consul Canada to Secretary of' State Bryan, November 26, 1914, in 
J!!l!, 1914, P• 627. 
106Brazilian Minister to Mexico Cardoso de Oliveira to Secretary of' 
State Bryan, November 29, 1914, in J:!m, .l:fil, · P.• 627. 
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suggested that the govemment~in Mexico City seemed harmonious, and per-
haps the United State could send an official communication concerning 
protection-of American lives and property. '!he President replied that 
the time was not ripe and the action might prove embarrassing until·the 
Conventionists had better solidified their position.107 
Wilson's refusal to recognize the Convention government was so cor-
rect th.at it was almost clairvoyant. By the end of December the true 
character of Villa had become increasingly obvious. Two of his generals, 
. _. I 
Rodolfo Fierro and Tomas Urbina, began the bloody task of purging anti .. 
. I 
Villistas and executing them.108 President Gutierrez• attempts to halt 
. ' 
this course were truitless,109 and appeared only to quicken a.break be .. 
tween Villa and the Provisional President. On December 29 Villa·acoused 
Gutilrrez of planning to abandon the capital and establishing the govern-
ment elsewhere, to which Guti,rrez answered that he could see no reason . 
to remain in an area where insubordination to his orders was rampant. 
Villa responded by sending a number of his troops to "protect" the Presi-
dent.llO Thus as 1914 ended the Carranza-Villa. split wa~ ll'l&tched by an-
other within Conventionist•s ranks, and there was even talk of Villa pro-
claiming himself dictator.111 
The beginning of the neW' year saw a decline . in Villa• s strength. On 
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January 5, in the first full-sea.le engagement with the Carrancistas, he 
I was defeated by Alvaro Obregon. The defeat was followed by his evacua-
tion or Mexico City in late January, whereupon the capital city was im-
mediately retaken by the Carrancistas.112 Now the nations that had dealt 
with the Convention government felt the brunt of Carranza•s displeasure. 
On February 15, he removed all government functions from Mexico City; 
thereby he left diplomats with no one w deal with in protecting the 
lives and:property of their nationa.ls.113 In addition, Carranza issued 
a decree making it necessary for all Constitutionalist genera.ls to refer 
all requests for protection to him and declared illegal the presence of 
confidential agents of foreign countries in the camps of generals.114 
All business would have to be conducted through Venustiano Carranza. 
As Pancho Villa's power rapidly dissipated, President Wilson was 
forced to cast about for alternatives. To ascertain the true strength of 
the factions in Mexico Duval West of Texas was sent to the war-torn coun-
try as another of Wilson's personal representatives.ll5 On March 15 West 
reported that Villa remained the leader with the best chance of bringing 
peace. This report would have been considerably less optimistic had it 
been written one month later. On April 16 the bloody and decisive battJ.e 
112vice Consul Silliman to Se.cretary of State Bryan, January 28, 
1915, in PRFR, 1915, P• 649. 
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ot Celaya was fought with disastrou..s results for Villa's arm;roll6 This 
engagement for all practical purposes eliminated Villa as a power in 
Mexico, although the United States continued attempts to rebuild his 
military strength. 
The military collaps$ or Villa left the field to Carranma, but still 
Wilson was not willing to recogni~e or morally SU.PP,Ort him. This re-
luctance was in part due to past attempts to deal with the First Chief.as 
well as the open hostility or the Catholic Church leadership in the United 
States toward Carranza.117 If Villa was•impotent and Carranza impossible, 
whom would the United. States support? At one point consideration was 
given to going outside the coterie or well-known revolutionaries in the 
hc:,pe or getting a man without the taint or factionalism that both Villa 
' ' 
and Carranma had. Fduardo Iturbide, who had been helped :f'rom Mexico in 
1914 by United states off'icials, was suggested by a.member or Wilson's 
cabinet as the man whom foreign investors, diplomats, and big bu.siness 
would all support. Wilson refused to be drawn into a scheme of this sort, 
and the idea was dropped.US In late April Secretary of State Bryan an-
nounced there were l?,O plans for recognizing anyone in Mex:1.co.119 The 
best the United states could offer was a statement by Woodrow Wilson that 
he was undecided, and that recognition would be given to the leader or 
group that could rally the people; but that it had better be soon, or the 
. ' ' 
United States would be forced to decide what action was necessary ''to 
; 
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,120 help Mexico save herself and serve her people.' The important new idea 
in this statement was the hint at a compromise government and at the use 
ot torce it one was not soon round. 
On June 17, 1915, Wilson asked !9. interim Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing it' unot't'icial channels existed in which the United States could 
tell Carranza that he could possibly be recognized it' he attempted to 
conciliate the opposition.121 John Silliman delivered this suggestion to 
Carranza.122 The reply made on June 22 was emphatic and curt. Carranza 
would not deal with Villa or ac~ept recognition based on his doing so.123 
Once more, the American President was checkmated. He had publicly de-
clared that if Mexico did not "save herself" the United States would be 
J. ,I 
forced to do so. The question was, how could this be done without an-
other Veracruz debacle? 
The answer to the question had been studied as early as March 8, 
1915, when Secretary of' state Bryan requested the counsel for the state 
Department, Robert Lansing, to determine what the results of direct force 
on Mexico could be and to suggest alternatives. Lansing replied that the 
use of force would be resented by the Mexican peeple, who would not be-
lieve it was only temporary action; that military intervention would 
further wreck the image ot the United States thrat2.ghout Latin America. 
Further, people within the United States would urge permanent occupation, 
120Ibid., June 3, 1915, P• 1. 
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and European governments would demand that the United States protect 
their interests, which would create additiona1 problems. None of these 
results would be agreeable if the United states acted unilaterally; but 
there was another course. The United States could act in conjunction 
with other Latin American nations as it had in negotiating the Veracruz 
incident. This would be Pan Americanism rather than imperialism.124 
By July Wilson had decided that jaint actian with the Latin American 
nations was the only practical route. By the end of that month the United 
States had outlined a fairly comprehensive plan to present to the con-
fereeso It was built around the idea of finding an individual other 
than Villa, Zapata or Carranza whom all factions would support. It 
should be a man who had not been directly involved in the recent civil 
war. The United States was adamant in the stand that it not be Carranzao 
If the proposed individual could be found, the United States and Pan-
American conferees would recognize and support him.125 
' . 
By August 2 plans for the Pan-American meetings were complete, and 
on the fifth the delegates met in New York City.126 It was decided in 
the first meeting that factions in Mexico should also start negotiations 
of their own in case the other Latin American diploma.ts could not decide 
the question. From the first there was general agreement rejecting 
124counoilor for State Department Lansing to Secretary of state 
Bryan, March 8, 1915, in Lansing Papers, II, PP• 529-.530. 
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delegates to this Confe~nce were Ambassador Domicio da Gama of Br~il, 
.Ambassador Eduardo Suarez-Mujica of ClµJ.e, .Ambassador Rom.ulo s. Na6n or 
Argentina, Minister Ignacio Calderln o:t Bolivi>, Minister Carlos Mar!a 
de Peira or Uruguay, and Minister Joaquin Mend(z of Guatemala. 
Carranzao127 &t the meeting or the £actions involved problems that only 
the United States could handle. Villa was obviously o:n. the verge or total 
collapse, which would put Carranza in the lead as the only substantial 
power in Mexico. Therefore a way would have to be round to sustain Villa 
so that he could act as a bargaining power for the conference. Thus the 
United States established meat inspection points in Chihuahua to allow 
Villa to market the cattJ.e rustJ.ed in Mexico.128 
The Pan-American conference had met for only six days when Wilson 
had a mysterious change of heart that was in direct contradiction to all 
that he had previously demanded. On August 11 he wrote Iansing that to 
insist on the elimination of Carranza was, after all, a littJ.e ridiculous. 
The tact could not be contested that Carranza was the strongest man in 
sight. The co:n,terence should remain f'lexible enough to leave the way 
open tor recognition of him.129 On August 15 Secretary or State-Lansing 
sent dispatched to Villa, Zapata and Carranza asking them to meet in a 
neutral. zone tor a conference under the auspices or the Pan-American ne-
gotiators.130 Carranza ~greed to a meeting only it it discussed the 
international. implications or the civil war a:nd the question of recog-
nition.131 Wilson agreed, and while he held meetings with the Carrancis-
1 • 
~ in Washing~n, another conference was held in Mexico to see on what 
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eondi tions the other rebels would submit to Carranza~ 132 
It was stUl necessary to convert the Latin American nations to the 
newline or th.inking, and these diplomats were not so agile in reversing 
their stand. By October 9 Lan.sing had succeeded in getting their con-
sent. Two days later the Secretary ot State wrote all ambassadorial pos·ts 
in Etlrope that the conference had decided the Carrancistas were the only 
party with the ingredients necessary tor recognition.133 On October 19 
the United States placed another embargo on all arms to Mexico, recog-
nizing Carranza as the de facto ruler of Mexico and excepting war ma-
terials fox- his use~l34 Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Bol:!.via, Uruguay, 
Guatemala, Colombia and Nicaragua followed this lead.135 
Arter two and one-half years ot torturous turning and twisting, 
Mexico at last was on the way to establishing a government that showed 
promise ot bringing stability. More importantly, this new regime had 
proven already ~at it possessed the ability to withstand 011tside pres-
sure 8l'1d interference. Mexico, a nation dominated and exploited by 
foreign forces since the revolution that treed it in the early 19th 
century, was independ~nt. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
Involved and trying relations between the United States and Mexico 
existed outside the yea.rs 1910-1915; however, interplay of this period 
gave it a particular significance and importa.nceo Both nations were 
undergoing a transition which cast them in a different character from 
previou:;; years. Mexico was beginning the laborious and still unobtained 
quest of gaining her rightful position in the Western Hemisphereo The 
United States was close to becoming a world leader with a foreign policy 
worthy of such a position. The former country was no longer willing to 
act as a colony to be exploited by others, while the latter found it in-
creasingly necessary to use more sophistication, and less force, in 
realizing its 'Will. 
In 1910 the United States Department of State was functioning under 
i 
a. policy derisively called "dollar diplomacy" by its enemieso This po-
licy was composed or a mutually beneficial coalition of government and 
the business classes. The surplus capital would be placed in backward, 
non-industrialized areas or the worldo The investors could logically 
expect high returns on their investment, and strong economic interests 
in these areas would greatly aid the foreign policy and influence or the 
United States. But the problems involving the unstable political con-
ditions u:;;ually present in undeveloped areas caused "dollar diplomacy" 
to be a little more complex in application than in theory. The point of 
contention was the extent to which the military might of the United 
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States should be employed to protect the financial interests of .American 
businessmen. It was generally assumed that su.ch force would be used when 
necessary, an assumption which President Taft supported in a number of 
speeches, including the one of December ? , 1909, in which he stated that 
American citizens cou1d rely on personal and property protection no 
matter where they resided. 
Latin .America was one of the areas where "dollar diplomacy" had been 
instituted, while Mexico was one of the leading recipients of the surplus 
capital ot the United States economy'. However, the question is not why 
the United States was so interested ;1.n that country, but rather why this 
interest did not take on a more forceful nature. Later circumstances 
indicated that the vague neutrality laws in eff'eot at the time could have 
supported any stand that was taken by t~e government in Washington. Th.er~ 
were also precedents tor active military intervention in Latin .America. 
But the fact remains that President Taft used neither of these potential 
weapons; the question is why. 
A reasonable answer to the question concerning the U:nited States ap.,, 
parent lack of interest in the revolutionary movements underway in Mexi ... 
co in 1910 has many facets. First, it was generally accepted that Por-
firio of.az had complete control of' Mexico and that no revolution could 
hope to remove him. When Francisco Madero started his revolt, officials 
in til.shington assumed that he was merely another in a long line of' indi~ 
vi,.duals with a high sounding principle and little chance of success. T4e 
United States government found it difficult to be overly concerned with 
such mino:r irritations. The Mexican rebel could have been imprisoned at 
an;r time, even though the United States kept.insisting that it lacked 
adequate proof of his violations of neutrality. Yet the Tart adminis-
tration refused to arrest him when requested to do so by the Mexican 
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authorities. This action or lack of it was not in support of Madero but 
a way of a,roiding.the needless controversy that would be engendered if an 
influential rebel were ~risoned. The second reason for the lack or a 
forceful policy by the United States •s the ra~dity with which of.az 
fell from power. Only a·short five months after the official starting , 
date of tb.e revolution, the old dictator had fallen, This speed, plus 
the earlier confidence in of.az, made action by the United States diffi-
cult to effect. 
Another partial explanation tor the vapid and weak attitude that 
Tart expressed during the Madero revolution was public opinion ~n the 
United States. The business leaders urged intervention £rem the begin-
, 
ni.ng, but the mass pf ~ricans expressed sympathy for Francisco Madero 
and the principles f'or which he fought. The Maderista junta in Washing-
ton, unable to meet with officials or the Taft administration, was still 
successful in creating an image of Madero as being the Mexican counter-
part to George Washington or Abr~ Lincoln. This rapport between the 
rebels.and the American people intensified as one approached the border. 
The pro-Madero inclination was also prevalent among the governors of' some 
of the border states as well as among the United States officials lo-
cated there. President Tart eventually realized this situation and mo-
bilized 16,000 troops to patrol the area, but the opportune time for such 
action had long since passed. Despite denials, use of' the troops gave 
the appearance that the United States had doubts about the ability or 
I 
Diaz to ~ndle the innrrection, whereupon the Mexican people looked a 
little closer at the M@dgri,sta.revolt. 
For these reasons the otticial policy of_the United States remained 
clearly neutral during the actions leading to the removal of' Porfirio 
'fl.az. It was a policy motivated by' over-confidence in the dictator, by 
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the swiftness of his decline, and by Taft's inability to decide what con-
ditions were in Mexico; but it was still neutra1ityo 
After Madero's regime had been installed lega1ly in October or 1911, 
President Ta.ft granted immediate recognition. There was no reason to 
compound past mistakes by not doing so. There were no strong pro-Diaz 
movements to ou.st the new President or Mexico, and Taft was not a man to 
lead a crusade without the bounds of diplomatic correctness. But the 
United States was in the process or changing its former attitude toward 
Mexican rebels and particularly those who fled to this countr;y. These 
changes did not involve immediate concrete legislation, bu.t rather a new 
interpretation of the laws that existed. Madero had been ~owed to 
roam at will when he fled to the United States in 1910. The reception 
accorded to Genera1 Bernardo Reyes in October and November of' 19].i was 
considerably cooler. After being in the United States less than one 
month, his activities had been investigated by United States eff'icia1s 
en the border. On November 18, 1911, he was arrestedo The rapidity ot 
this action was due in part to the effectiveness of Madero•s agents in 
providing bona :tide evidence that Reyes had violated the laws. The tact 
' . . 
remains that he had done no more than had Madero in 1910. Btlt United 
States officia1s were quick to investigate him and limit his activities 
along the border although he had taken no overt action against the Ma-
dero regime.l 
The changes that were evolving in 1911 oulminated with two spe-
cific measures in 1912. On March 4 ot that year 9ongress passed a joint 
resolution giving the president authority to embargo military supplies 
1 . . ', . . . 
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to all factions in Mexico, bit allowing access to these supplies by the 
forces of the central governmento In October of 1912 the United States 
Department of War received orders to arrest all rebels entering the 
United States from Mexico. Justification for this action was Section 
XIV of the Neutrality Laws. This section, by a liberal interpretation, 
could be used, but. as written it covered only those who were preparing 
to launch military expeditions from the United States. Whether these 
revolutionary refugees were ma.king plans for a military expedition or not 
was beside the point. This fact could not be ascertained the instant the 
rebels crossed into the United States, yet if obsel."Ved they would be ar-
rested at that instant. 
These changes in policy could only be justified by the constant ir-
ritation faced by the United States government in dealing with rebel 
factions along the border. \\bat had been expected to be only a temporary 
problem in 1910 was found to be a constant condition in 1912. This con-
dition necessitated a policy that was firmer and harsher to prevent 
further difficulties. 
If the foreign policy of William Howard Taft was based on an un-
certain expediency, that of vbodrow Wilson was constructed on a base of 
good intentions. President Wilson as a diplomatist stands as a warning 
to those who ,believe that high ideals and principles should be univer-
sally recognized in the field of foreign affairs. He was a democrat by 
birth-right and choice, a moralist by temperament, and an international 
idealist by reason of inexperience. To Wilson, the governments of other 
countries were as good or as bad as they were democratic or undemocratic. 
His criterion for determining a dEl!locracy included universal suffrage and 
responsible government. The Mexico that confronted him in 1913-1915 had 
neither of these; thus she would need to be led by the United states into 
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the .fold of the democratic nations of the worldo 
W:>odrow Wilson was an idealist in ends but not in methodso To reach 
the desired objective, it mattered little with whom he dealt. He con-
stantly vacillated between factions at work in Mexico, and in a period of 
slightly more than two years he had given support to all of them. In 
studying this confusing patch-work there are certain trends that can be 
. detected. From March, 1913, to August of the same year Wilson attempted 
to negotiate directJ.y with the Haertista government tor the removal of' 
the dictator and the creation of some sort of temporary coalition govern-
ment that would permit free elections. By October and Haerta• s partioi- · ,;s,\( 
pation in the elections or that month, the American President turned to 
negotiation with Venustiano Carranza and carried this to the extent of 
allowing the rebels to get arms in March of 1914. The inability of the 
Constitutionalists to produce on their promises of de.feating Haerta with 
United states military supplies turned President Wilson to unilateral 
action at Veracruz in June of 1914. The resentment engendered by this 
action provided the opportunity for a Pan-American answer to the Mexican 
situation. This was the Niagara Conference which started in May of 1914. 
After Haerta•s fall, in part due to the slowness of the Pan-American con-
ference to reach a decision, the Constitutionalist forces split, and 
Wilson was faced with a choice between Pancho Villa and Venustiano Car-
ranza. His choice fell on Villa because he expressed a child-like eager-
ness to follow the ;Lead of the United States and also because Carranza 
had been reluctant to follow Wilson's recommendations. By February of' 
1915 Villa's power was only a memary due.to the onslaught of' the Carran-
. I 
zista General, Alvaro Obregon. Still WUi;;on refused to support Car-
ranza, and Pan-Americanism was.once again called to extricate the United 
States from an impossible situation. On August 2 these conferences 
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started with all sides agreed that Carranza would not be considered as 
the man to solve the Mexican crisis~ Nine days later Wilson reversed him-
self for the fourth time in two years and urged the recognition of Venus-
tiano Carranza. 
The only consistency in these obtuse and contorted trends was the 
desire to bring responsible government to Mexico. They do not represent 
a long-range, realistically conceived policy to settle the Mexican crisis. 
Rather they provide an excellent study of a collision between ideals and 
reality. 
In all of his dealings with Mexico President Wl.lson was hampered by 
his ignorance of the Mexican character and by what he considered to be a 
lack of appreciation on the part of the rebels for what he was attempt-, 
ing. The American President expected the rebel leaders publicly to ex-
press their support of his every action, providing it was done in the 
name of their cause. This expectation was impossible and impolitic. 
When American troops seized Veracruz on April 14 Wilson f'lllly expected 
the Constitutionalists to applaud the action. Wlen this applause was not 
forthcoming, he was hurt and resentful. In November of 1913 he ha.d sent 
WUliam B. Hale to Hemosillo to obtain Carranza•s pledge to follow cer-
tain conditions, including a statement that United States interests were 
dominant in Mexico. The refusal of the rebels to go along with these 
conditions was also never understood by Wilson. The President, as a 
trained political scientist, should have recog~zed that the years of 
sharing a common border with the United states in its moods of expansion 
had given birth to a distrust of the motives and intentions of the coun-
try to the north. This attitude was latent but omnipresent. Therefore, 
no faction could afford to give a sincere and complete endorsement to 
plans conceived by the Chief Executive of the United States. This is not 
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to say that it was impossible f'or Woodrow Wilson to lead and direct the 
revolution, but such direction could be onl.y as effective as it was un-
noticed. 
Of' equal importance in understanding Mexican-United States relations 
during Wilson's term was the view or revolution held by the President and 
the American people. The United States had been created by a revolt 
against what was considered a tyra.nnical political power. still earlier, 
our English heritage with its emphasis on the political aspects or the 
revolution of' 1641 and 1688 had also inclined Americans to think of' revo-
lution as predominantJ.y political. Both of' these national experiences 
made the United States see the Mexican revolution as the same type or 
movement. This view was not completely fallacious, since the. people of' 
Mexico did have political reason for revolting. But of' much more im-
portance were t:he social and economic aspects of the revolution. Mexicans 
knew very li ttl.e of ballot boxes and proportional representation, but 
they were aware of' their lack of food and land; and they knew that life 
and hunger were synonomous. The future offered littJ.e hope of change. 
Therefore their resentment was conce~trated more against a system than a 
man, and a hated system which was old, all-pervasive and entrenched. It 
I 
would require more than the removal of' a Diaz or a ~erta and the substi-
tution of a democrat. To effect genuine refo?'lll the superstitious hold of' 
the church muld have to be smashed, the army emasculated, foreign money 
reduced in infiuence, and land more evenly distributed. Thus, wh:ile the 
United States had treed itself' by revolution, Mexico recreated hersel~ 
with a similar action. President Wilson was exceedingly slow in realizing 
this basic factor, and it is q,dt.e possible that he never thoroughly 
comprehended it; most of' his pl~ns :tor settling the internal strife of' 
Mexico were politically oriented. This tact can be seen in the 
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instrllctions given to John Lind in August, 1913, which. outlined a settle-
ment that was entirely political and constructed on the presumption that 
tree elections would solve all. This same fault was also present in 
Wilson's belief that Carranza and Villa could negotiate their ditter-
enoes and unite on some common ground. As one correspondent at work in 
Mexico stated, this would be like asking Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt 
to confer, or even more like expecting "Bill Haywood and Judge Gary to 
get together."2 
Merely listing the blunders of Woodrow Wilson in Mexico would be un-
just and false to the truth,. He did make many mistakes, but in the midst 
or these he gave indications that times were changing. His determination 
to talk rather than to use military force ..,.s admir~ble~. It is true t:h.at 
he did eventually use force, bllt only atter he had exhausted all visible 
altematiyes. His belief in Pan-Americanism, albeit one dominated by the 
United States, was often an expedient way out of uncomfortable situa-
tions, but it did tu.rther the idea or multilateral Latin American policy 
rather than a series of unilateral doctrines issued by the United States. 
' ' 
All in all, ~e chief contribntion made by Wllso:n in these years was a 
determination to improve the conditions of the submerged classes of La.tin 
America. His efforts were faulty, inconsistent, and often fruitless, but 
no one can deny the sincerity of his efforts. Perhaps this quality sh,ould 
soften the harsh summing up of the failures of a man who labored dili-
gently, if not wisely. 
2Lincoln steffens to Colonel :Edward M. House in El.la Winter and 
Granville Hicks (eds.), The Letters !.t Lincoln Steffens (2 vols.; New 
York: Harcourt, Brace&: Co., 1938), I, p. 35~. 
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APPENDIX 
NEUTRALITY LAW3 IN EFFEX:T, 1910-1915 
SEC 9. Every citizen of the United states who, within the territo:ey 
or jurisdiction thereof, accepts and exercises a commission to serve a 
foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, in war, by land or by 
sea, against any prince; state, colony, district, or people, with whom 
the United States are at peace, shall be fined not more tha:n two thousand 
dollars and imprisoned not.more than three years. 
SEC. 10. Whoever, within the territoriy'or jurisdiction or the 
Un;i.ted States, enlists, or enters 'him,selt, or hires or retains another 
person to enlist or enter himself, or to 'go beyond the limits or juris-
diction or the Umted states with intent to be enlisted or entered in the 
service or any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a 
sol~ier, or as a marine or seaman, o:n board 0£ any vessel or war, letter 
of marque, or priva~er, sha:11.be fined not more than one thousand dollars 
and imprisoned riot more than three years. 
SEC. 11. Wh~ever, within the territory or jurisdiction or the United 
States, fits out and arms, or attempts to get out and arm., or preoures to 
be fitted out and armed, or knowingly i.s copcerned in the furnishing, 
fitting out, or a~ng of any vessel, with intent that such vessel shall 
be em.ployed.in the service of any':t'oreign prince or state or or any 
.colony, district, or people, to cruise or commit hostilities against the 
subjects, citizens~ or property or any foreign princ.e. or state, or. of 
any colony, district, or people, with whCll'l the United States are at 
peace, or whoever issues or delivers a commission within the territory or 
jurisdiction or t~e United States for any vessel, to the intent that.she 
may be so' em.ployed, shall be fined not more than ten thousand doll.ars and 
imprisoned not more than three years. And every such ve.ssel, her tackle, 
apparel, and furniture, together with all materials, arm.s, ammunition, 
and stores which may have been procured for the b:tilding and equipment 
thereof, shall be forfeited; one half to the use or the informer and the 
other half to the use or the United States. 
SEX:. 12. Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the 
United States, increases or augments, or procures to be increased or aug~ 
mented, or knowingly is concerned in increasing or augmenting, the force 
or aey ship or war, cru.iser, or other armed vessel which, at the time or 
her arrival within tb.e·United States, was a.ship or war, or cru.iser, or 
armed vessel, in the service or any foreign prinoe or state, or of a:n;r 
colony, district, or people, or belonging to the subjects or citizens or 
a:n;r such prince or state, colony, district, or people, the same being at 
war with any foreign prince.or state, or of any colo:n;r, district, or 
people, with whCll'l the United States are at peace, by adding to the number 
of the guns c,f such vessel, or by changing those on board or her for guns 
of a larger caliber, or by adding thereto any equipment solely applicable 
to war, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned 
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not more than one year. 
SECo l'.3. Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the 
United states, begins, or sets on foot, or provides or prepares the means 
for, any military expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence 
against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state, or of 
any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace, 
shall be fined not more than three thousand dollars and imprisoned not 
more than three yearso 
SEC. 14. The district courts shall take cognizance of all com-
plaints, by whomsoever instituted, in cases of captures made within the 
waters of the United States, or within a marine league of the coasts or 
shores thereof. In every case in which a vessel is titted out and armed, 
or attempted to be titted out and armed, or in which the force of any 
vessel of war, .cruiser, or other amed vessel is increased ,or augmented, 
or in which any military expedition or enterprise is begun or set on 
foot, contrary to the provisions and prohibitions of this chapter; and in 
every case of the capture of a vessel within the jurisdiction or pro~ 
tection of the United states as before defined; and in every case in which 
any process issuing out of any court of the United States is disobeyed o:r 
resisted by any person having the custody of any vessel of war, cruiser, 
or other armed vessel of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, 
district, or people, or of any subjects or citizens of any foreign prince 
or state, or of any colony, district, or people, it shall be lawful for 
the President, or such other person as he shall have empowered for that 
purpose, to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United 
States, or of the militia thereof, for the purpose of taking possession 
of and detaining any such vessel, with her prizes, if any, in order to 
enforce the execution of the prohibitions and penalties of this chapter, 
and the restoring of such prizes in the cases in which restoration shall 
be adjudged; and also for the purpose of preventing the carrying on of 
any such expedition or enterprise from the territory or jurisdiction of 
the United States against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince 
or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United 
States are at peace. 
SEC. 15. It shall be lawful for the President, or such person as he 
shall empower for that purpose, to employ such part of the land or naval 
forces of the United States, or of the militia thereof, as shall be 
necessary to compel any foreign vessel to depart the United States in all 
cases in which, by the laws or nations or the treaties of the United 
States, she ought not to remain within the United States. 
S:ECo 16. The owners or consignees of every armed vessel sailing out 
of the ports of, or under the jurisdiction of, the United States, be= 
longi~g wholly or in part to citizens thereof, shall, before clearing out 
the same, give bond to the United States, with sufficient sureties, in 
double the amount of the value of the vessel and cargo on board, inc.1uding 
her armament, conditioned that the vessel shall not be employed by such 
owners to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, o:r 
property of any foreign prince or state, or or any colony, district, or 
people, with whom the United States are at peace. · 
SEC. 17. The several collectors of the customs shall detail any 
vessel manifestly bu.ilt for warlike purposes, and about to depart the 
United States, or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, the 
cargo of which principally consists of arms and munitions of war, when 
the number of men shipped on board, or other circumstances, render it 
probable that such vessel is intended to be employed by the owners to 
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cruise or commit hostilities upon the subjects, citizens, or property of 
any foreign prince or state, or of' any colony, district, or people with 
whom the United States are at peace, until the decision of the President 
is had thereon, or until the owner gives such bond and security as is re .. 
quired of' the owners o~ armed·vessels by the preceding section. 
SEC. 18. ··The provisions or this chapter shall not be construed to 
extend to any subject or citizen of any foreign prince or state~ colony, 
district, or people who is transiently within the United States and en-
lists or enters himself on board.of any vessel or war, letter of marque, 
or privateer, which at the time of its arrl,val within the United States 
was fitted and equipped as such, or hires or retains another subject or 
citizen or the same foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people on 
board to serve such foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people on 
board such vessel of' war, letter of marque, or privateer, if the United 
States shall then be at peace with such foreign prince, state, colony, 
district, or people. Nor shall they be construed to prevent the prose-
cution or punishmeft of treason, or or any piracy defined by the laws of 
the United states. · 
lu. s. Statutes il Larle, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1909), mv, pp. 10 9-1091. 
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